The article is devoted to the methods of the U.S. response to the process of forced change of power in South Korea during the military coup of 1961. The process of changing the existing U.S. policy towards Korea was launched shortly before the revolutionary events due to the available information about conspiracy. However, new approaches were still being in development, and the May 16 coup took the Americans by surprise. Washington's initial attempt to support the legitimate authorities proved ineffective under the new conditions. As a result, the Americans took a survivalist position and watched the establishment of a military rule from the sidelines. By mid-summer of 1961, the Americans had already accept-ed the authoritarian regime that had suspended the republican constitu-tion, suppressed any sprouts of opposition, and was unwilling to return civilian control of the government in the short term. The coup leader, Park Chung-hee, was perceived by Americans as a «strong, fair, and in-telligent leader» who acted as a bridge between the government and the people and effectively combated traditional Korean factionalism. The sit-uation in the country stabilized and the risks of a counter-coup were min-imized. The temporary banning of political parties, as well as other «questionable methods» of the new authorities, was perceived by Ameri-cans as an attribute of the revolutionary atmosphere of the transition pe-riod. From the U.S. point of view, the rise to power in Korea of a group intolerant of corruption and, at the same time, anti-communist, was a great success.