The Influence the Qatari-Israeli and the Qatari-American Relations on the Qatar's Arab Policy

 
PIIS086919080015563-6-1
DOI10.31857/S086919080015563-6
Publication type Article
Status Published
Authors
Occupation: Senior Research Fellow, Center for Study of Common Problems of Contemporary East, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences
Affiliation: Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences
Address: Russian Federation, Moscow
Journal nameVostok. Afro-Aziatskie obshchestva: istoriia i sovremennost
EditionIssue 4
Pages107-117
Abstract

As Qatar’s ambitions to become a regional player grew, it repeatedly offered to broker peace between Israel and the Arab states, and also tried to negotiate between conflicting parties. But Sunni Gulf States are irritated by this mediation and suppose that Doha tries to undermine stability of Arab countries. This is the reason for the tension in Doha's relations with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. As a result, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt declared a blockade on Qatar in June 2017. They accused Qatar of supporting terrorism, demanded to break off all ties with Iran and to close the Turkish military base on its own territory. Qatar tries to ease tensions with the Gulf States by using American lobbyists, Israeli interests, and the Jewish-American community. Qatar follows defensive realism in the combination with the “buck passing” strategy – transferring the responsibility to act to other States while remaining on the sidelines. This is transferring the responsibility to act to the U.S. Qatar's relations with Israel and the Jewish-American community should shift the U.S. position in favor of Qatar.

The main conclusions are the following: 1) there is little chance of luck lobbying in the U.S. for any interests of any State that cooperates with Iran. But the development of Qatari-Israeli relations makes it difficult to accuse Qatar of supporting Iran; 2) the development of Qatari – Saudi crisis shows that attempt both rival parties to “buck-pass” by one superpower is inefficient. The reason is that both Qatar and Saudi coalition act like US's clients.

KeywordsQatar diplomatic crisis, Qatari-Israeli relations, lobbying in the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, the UAE, Jewish Americans
Received22.06.2021
Publication date24.08.2021
Number of characters26239
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1 Внешней политике Катара на современном этапе посвящен ряд работ отечественных исследователей, хотя Эмират и пребывает в тени внимания российских востоковедов к «старшим» монархиям Залива и таким ключевым странам Арабского мира, как Египет и Ирак. Участие Катара в дестабилизации режимов М. Каддафи, Х. Мубарака и Б. Асада изучал А. Борисов [Борисов, 2013]. В. Исаев и А. Филоник посвятили свою работу экономическому росту Катара, затронув внешнеполитические факторы [Исаев, Филоник, 2015]. Посреднические усилия Эмирата, организацию переговоров между участниками конфликтов в Ливии, Ливане, Йемене исследовал А. Букин [Букин, 2014]. А. Демченко анализировал политику Катара в увязке с внутренними причинами, общими для Арабского Востока [Демченко, 2010]. В контексте событий Большого Ближнего Востока рассматривали политику Эмирата Г. Косач, Е. Мелкумян [Мелкумян, 2013; Косач, Мелкумян, 2012], А. Подцероб [Подцероб, 2011].
2 Однако израильский вектор в политике Дохи и влияние отношений с еврейским государством на достижение других целей внешней политики Катара исследованы недостаточно. В большинстве работ отношения арабских стран с Израилем рассматриваются в парадигме противостояния. В реальной политике эти отношения сложнее. Арабский мир давно не озвучивает планов ликвидировать «очаг сионизма в Палестине» и «де-факто» признает еврейское государство. Египет подписал мирный договор с Израилем в 1979 г., Иордания юридически признает еврейское государство с 1994 г., официально нормализовали свои отношения с Израилем ОАЭ (август 2020 г.), Бахрейн (сентябрь 2020 г.), Марокко (декабрь 2020 г.) и Судан (январь 2021 г.). Все это имеет непосредственное отношение к сделке века – объявленному 28 января 2020 г. президентом США Д. Трампом плану политического урегулирования палестино-израильской проблемы, который предусматривал выделение 50 млрд долл. Палестине, Египту, Иордании и Ливану с сохранением оккупированных палестинских территорий за Израилем при согласии ключевых арабских стран. Многие арабские страны понимают, что, как только дело касается их отношений с США, «слово» Израиля начинает иметь большое значение. Поэтому неформальное сотрудничество с еврейским государством дает много преимуществ. В этом быстро убедились ОАЭ, когда зашла речь о закупках американских истребителей F-35 [Likud, 2020].
3 В 2003 г. Катар попробовал себя на роль посредника между арабскими странами и Израилем. Министры иностранных дел Катара и Израиля – шейх Хамад бен Джассим Аль Тани и Сильван Шалом –встретились в Париже, чтобы обсудить мирную повестку на Ближнем Востоке. В мае 2003 года шейх Хамад не исключил возможности заключения договора о мире с Израилем, если это будет отвечать интересам Катара. В 2005 г. в поисках путей выхода Израиля из Газы шейх Хамад встретился с министром иностранных дел Израиля Ципи Ливни на полях сессии ООН в Нью-Йорке.

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