Rationality of behavior of Russian public companies’ executives in cash flow management

Occupation: analyst
Affiliation: Institute for Economic Strategies of the Social Sciences Division of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Address: Russian Federation

Journal name

Obshchestvo i ekonomika

Edition

Issue 1

Pages

59-65

Abstract

The author considers the influence of Russian public companies' executives on cash flows, with special role being assigned to financial restrictions which allow the company to redistribute equity through dividend payment. It is stated, that financial restrictions give the possibility to estimate the level of business transparency. The information asymmetry being insignificant, Russian public companies are free to follow the pecking order theory, choosing a source of financing in accordance with its value.

Keywords

cash flow management, corporate transparency, financial restrictions, management, equity, the pecking order theory of financing, information asymmetry

Received

30.01.2020

Publication date

31.01.2020

Number of characters

14656

Cite

GOST	Lutsenko S. Rationality of behavior of Russian public companies’ executives in cash flow management // Obshchestvo i ekonomika – 2020. – Issue 1 C. 59-65 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://oie.jes.su/S020736760008039-1-1 (circulation date: 25.04.2024). DOI: 10.31857/S020736760008039-1
MLA	Lutsenko, Sergey "Rationality of behavior of Russian public companies’ executives in cash flow management." Obshchestvo i ekonomika 1 (2020):59-65. DOI: 10.31857/S020736760008039-1
APA	Lutsenko S. (2020). Rationality of behavior of Russian public companies’ executives in cash flow management. Obshchestvo i ekonomika (1), pp.59-65 DOI: 10.31857/S020736760008039-1

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