On economic assessment of long-term and shortterm interests in corporate governance

Occupation: analyst
Affiliation:
The Corporate and Project Management Institute (Moscow)
Institute for Economic Strategies of the Social Sciences Division of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow)

Address: Russian Federation

Journal name

Obshchestvo i ekonomika

Edition

Issue 4

Pages

24-34

Abstract

The author considers the economic aspect of planning time-frames for economic activities of a company. The article offers a mechanism for legal assessment aimed at resolving the conflicts among the parties whose interests differ in time. The priorities for the accommodation of short-term and long-term interests can be specified in corporate documents following the best practices of corporate governance. The situation becomes intolerable, if some of shareholders hinder investments into the company, being guided exclusively by short-term benefits. The actions of such shareholders harm the long-term interests of the company as well as the interests of other shareholders. The statute can protect the company from abuse by the management or by individual shareholders.

Keywords

company interests, economic strategy, short-term interests, longterm interests, statute, management, owner, shareholder, corporate governance

Received

17.04.2019

Publication date

18.04.2019

Number of characters

28707

Cite

GOST	Lutsenko S. On economic assessment of long-term and shortterm interests in corporate governance // Obshchestvo i ekonomika – 2019. – Issue 4 C. 24-34 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://oie.jes.su/S020736760004760-5-1 (circulation date: 27.04.2024). DOI: 10.31857/S020736760004760-5
MLA	Lutsenko, Sergey "On economic assessment of long-term and shortterm interests in corporate governance." Obshchestvo i ekonomika 4 (2019):24-34. DOI: 10.31857/S020736760004760-5
APA	Lutsenko S. (2019). On economic assessment of long-term and shortterm interests in corporate governance. Obshchestvo i ekonomika (4), pp.24-34 DOI: 10.31857/S020736760004760-5

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