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Eduard Daladier and the Policy of «Appeasement» on the Eve of World War II
 
PIIS013038640002212-1-1
DOI10.31857/S000523100000108-2
Publication type Article
Status Published
Authors
Aleksander Vershinin 
Affiliation: Lomonosov Moscow State University
Address: Russian Federation, Moscow
Journal nameNovaia i noveishaia istoriia
Edition
Pages42-70
Abstract

The article examines the reaction of the French political circles to the revolution of1917 in Russia. The emphasis is on their perception of the pre-revolutionary crisis, theattitude to the revolution itself and its consequences. It is emphasized that this reactionwas distinguished by ambiguity. On the one hand, French politicians were expecting revolutionaryevents, some of them considered them beneficial. At the same time, the needto preserve the combat capability of the Russian army and the continued participation of Russia in the First World War raised serious concerns. The French ruling circles could notresolve this dilemma.

KeywordsE. Daladier, the Russian Revolution of 1917, the First World War, R. Poincare, J. Clemenceau.
Received06.11.2018
Publication date07.11.2018
Number of characters99352
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