Mechanisms for distribution of academic research and financing in scientific collectives

 
PIIS042473880017512-2-1
DOI10.31857/S042473880017512-2
Publication type Article
Status Published
Authors
Affiliation: The National Research Center "Zhukovsky Institute"
Address: Russian Federation,
Occupation: Chief Researcher
Affiliation: Central Economics and Mathematics Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences (CEMI RAS)
Address: Nakhimovky prospect 47
Journal nameEkonomika i matematicheskie metody
EditionVolume 57 Issue 4
Pages59-65
Abstract

Authors consider the mechanisms for the distribution of income and academic research withinresearch teams with a fixed total amount of funding and payments proportional to the publication activity of scientists. This situation is typical for the grant research projects and fundamental science organizations that use incentive bonuses for the effectiveness of scientific activities. It is shown that if team members act selfishly, maximizing their net income (minus the cost of writing scientific papers), their equilibrium net incomes are many times lower, and the total number of papers written by them is many times higher than in the case of a “cartel collusion”, when the team as a whole writes a certain minimum required number of articles. Mutually beneficial (in comparison with competitive equilibrium) distribution of the amount of work and payments between the participants of the “scientific cartel” can vary widely. It is alsoshown that the competitive mechanism leads to the “washing out” of research teams scientists with high opportunity costs of writing scientific papers, to an increased risk of unethical behavior of some scientists and, probably, to a decrease in the quality of papers to the detriment of their quantity.

Keywordsresearch funding, scientist productivity, competition, incentives, cooperation, efficiency.
Received18.11.2021
Publication date13.12.2021
Number of characters19442
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