The economic function of state paternalism: the preoduction of patronized goods or investments in development?

Occupation: Professor, Head of the Laboratory for Comparative Research of Socio-Economic Systems, Faculty of Economics, Lomonosov Moscow State University; Chief Researcher at the Institute of Economics (RAS)
Affiliation:
Lomonosov Moscow State University
Institute of Economy, Russian Academy of Sciences
Address: Russian Federation, Moscow

Journal name

Obshchestvo i ekonomika

Edition

Issue 10

Pages

5-16

Abstract

The economic role of the state and the functions of state paternalism have long been a subject of controversy. Therefore, two main areas of research on this issue can be distinguished: the problem of state participation in the production and distribution of certain benefits, and the problem of state participation in the regulation of economic processes. In the theory of patronized goods, it is concluded that the state does not simply replace the market in the provision of certain goods, but represents certain public interests that are not reducible to individual ones, and serves precisely to ensure them. In that way, the state ensures the development of the economy and the achievement of social goals. The next step in the study of the functions of the paternalistic state is to find a common basis, both for the processes of providing patronized goods, and for the participation of the state in the regulation of the economy.

Based on the concept of the “developmental state”, we can conclude that such a common basis is the need for the participation of the state in providing the necessary conditions for the reproduction of the economy and society. Such a need arises due to the high level of socialization of production and the gradual disintegration of market relations, which, due to their automatic action, are no longer able to provide either the conditions for reproduction or even market equilibrium.

Keywords

paternalistic state, civil society, patronized goods, economic reproduction, public interest, individual preferences, development state

Received

04.09.2022

Publication date

10.11.2022

Number of characters

25340

Cite

GOST	Kolganov A. The economic function of state paternalism: the preoduction of patronized goods or investments in development? // Obshchestvo i ekonomika – 2022. – Issue 10 C. 5-16 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://oie.jes.su/S020736760021857-1-1 (circulation date: 30.04.2024). DOI: 10.31857/S020736760021857-1
MLA	Kolganov, Andrey "The economic function of state paternalism: the preoduction of patronized goods or investments in development?." Obshchestvo i ekonomika 10 (2022):5-16. DOI: 10.31857/S020736760021857-1
APA	Kolganov A. (2022). The economic function of state paternalism: the preoduction of patronized goods or investments in development?. Obshchestvo i ekonomika (10), pp.5-16 DOI: 10.31857/S020736760021857-1

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