Iran in the World Oil Market

 
PIIS013122270007783-2-1
DOI10.20542/0131-2227-2019-63-11-26-37
Publication type Article
Status Published
Authors
Occupation: Head of Center for Energy Studies
Affiliation: Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO)
Address: 23, Profsoyuznaya Str., Moscow, 117997, Russian Federation
Occupation: Senior Researcher
Affiliation: Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO)
Address: 23, Profsoyuznaya Str., Moscow, 117997, Russian Federation
Journal nameMirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia
EditionVolume 63 Issue 11
Pages26-37
Abstract

Iran is the fourth world largest holder of proved oil reserves, extraction costs of Iranian oil are comparatively low. Oil production dynamics in the country is sharply cyclical and these cycles are generated by political factors, exogenous to the oil sector. Peak in oil production was achieved in 1974 and for the last forty years Iran’s share in the world oil production is declining. The article reveals that among powerful exogenous shocks negatively affecting the dynamics of oil production in Iran there were unilateral and multilateral sanctions. The first sanctions against Iran were introduced by the USA in 1979. Since the middle of the 1990-ies sanctions have become a system. The long-term negative effects of sanctions substantially exceed the short-term ones. Largely due to the sanctions the technological level of Iranian oil sector remains very low. Global energy companies and banks prefer to reject interactions with Iranian counterparties due to the expanding practice of the extraterritorial regime of US sanctions that has transformed Iranian hydrocarbons into a “toxic asset”. Asia-Pacific countries, preserving oil import from Iran under the sanctions regime, got an opportunity to set very favorable for them terms of contracts. Iranian oil is bought with a price discount, for partially convertible and/or unconvertible currencies, often in exchange for a counter barter supply of goods. Expectations that non-Western oil companies would substitute for European investments have failed so far. Given the accelerating global race for monetization of hydrocarbon reserves and risk of forthcoming peak in global demand for oil there is a growing probability that a substantial part of commercially competitive Iranian oil reserves will remain in the ground.

KeywordsIran, world oil market, sanctions, foreign investment, technological level, buy back contracts, new type of oil contract, US, European Union, China
Received03.12.2019
Publication date09.12.2019
Number of characters30994
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1 Иран – одна из самых старых нефтяных стран мира. Нефтяной сектор этой страны создан с нуля иностранным капиталом. Первая концессия на поиск нефти была заключена в 1872 г., а первая нефть обнаружена в 1908 г. Коммерческая добыча началась в 1913 г. С середины 1930-х годов доходы от экспорта нефти стали играть важную роль в формировании бюджета. В 1951 г. Иран вторым после Мексики национализировал нефтяную промышленность. Однако фактический контроль над разработкой и добычей нефти через национальную государственную компанию National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) был установлен только в 1974 г. По доказанным запасам нефти в 2017 г. Иран занимал четвертое место в мире после Венесуэлы, Саудовской Аравии и Канады [1], а издержки ее добычи, как и в Саудовской Аравии, самые низкие в мире [2]. Выгодное географическое положение в принципе позволяет поддерживать масштабный нефтяной экспорт на все основные мировые рынки. При этом динамика нефтедобычи имеет ярко выраженный циклический характер, что обусловлено экзогенными политическими факторами.
2

ЭКЗОГЕННЫЕ ФАКТОРЫ И ЦИКЛЫ ДИНАМИКИ НЕФТЕДОБЫЧИ

3 Начиная с 1913 г. добыча нефти в Иране поступательно росла с перерывом на начальный период Второй мировой войны, спровоцировавшей дезорганизацию мировых нефтяных потоков. К 1950 г. добыча достигла почти 665 тыс. барр. в день, или 6.4% мировой нефтедобычи (рис. 1). Форсированная радикальная национализация нефтяного сектора, проведенная правительством Мосаддыка в 1950 г., была встречена западными компаниями в штыки, и в 1951–1953 гг. добыча нефти в Иране снизилась до нулевых отметок. Возобновление взаимодействия с международными компаниями произошло после свержения Мосаддыка. На уровень 1950 г. нефтедобыча вернулась в 1957 г.
4 С середины 1960-х годов в шахском Иране началась реализация политики ускоренной модернизации сверху, которая получила дополнительный импульс в 1974 г. Опираясь на умеренный национализм в рамках концепции “великой иранской цивилизации”, шах поставил стратегическую цель трансформировать Иран к концу XX в. в пятую ведущую промышленную державу мира [6]. Финансовую основу должны были составить доходы от экспорта нефти. Иран форсировал ее добычу, выступал ценовым ястребом в ОПЕК, стал одним из инициаторов шока 1973/1974 гг. Опора на западные технологии позволила ему по объему нефтедобычи выйти на четвертое место в мире после Советского Союза, США и Саудовской Аравии (в 1974 г. добывалось 6 млн барр. нефти в день, то есть 10.3% мировой добычи).
5 Как и в большом числе развивающихся стран, политика модернизации сверху, опиравшаяся на авторитарную власть, поддерживаемую ведущей партией, государственными компаниями и централизованным планированием в форме пятилеток, провалилась. Во-первых, невозможно быстро и органично трансформировать отсталое традиционное общество посредством запущенных и подстегиваемых сверху процессов урбанизации и индустриализации. Во-вторых, форcированная импортозамещающая индустриализация вела к усилению зависимости национальной экономики от импорта и соответственно требовала вливания нефтедолларов в возрастающих масштабах.

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