J. Savulescus The God Machine as a Moral Agent and the Problem of Responsibility

This article is devoted to the issue of moral responsibility in connection with artificial intelligence technologies. In recent years, artificial intelligence has been actively developing towards greater autonomy, which makes the philosophical analysis of artificial moral agency extremely relevant. The relevance of the work is also determined by the increasing spread of artificial intelligence in professional areas, including those related to the adoption of responsible managerial, financial, etc. solutions. The main object of research in the article is a thought experiment — the project of the so-called “The God Machine” by the Western philosopher J. Savulescu, which allows us to turn to such an important aspect as the possibility of the influence of artificial intelligence on the development of human moral consciousness, since modern technologies, along with projects of biological moral human enhancement, claim the ability to create artificial moral agents. The authors give a comprehensive analysis of this project, correlating it with other concepts of modern analytical philosophy of consciousness, incl. Н. Frankfurt. The theoretical focus of the study is directed to the concepts of responsibility and freedom as key in formulating the criteria of moral agency. At the same time, the article considers the features of the implementation of the criteria of moral agency in relation to artificial intelligence. The article assesses the viability of J. Savulescu's project, in particular: to what extent artificial intelligence like the The God Machine can be considered as a moral agent, whether a person can acquire the characteristics of a moral, responsible and free person with the help of such an artificial mediator, and to what extent such projects contribute to the moral enhancement of mankind. It also points to the risks of paternalistic interference in the development of morality. Separately, the phenomenon of moral dilemmas is considered in connection with the problems of embedding artificial intelligence in the life of modern society, as well as the logical aspects of decision-making in the context of moral conflicts. The conclusion is formulated about the key importance of the category of responsibility for modeling the relationship between man and artificial intelligence in machine ethics.

Keywords

moral responsibility, moral agency, artificial intelligence, biological moral enhancement, freedom, moral dilemmas, J. Savulescu, H. Frankfurt

Received

28.06.2023

Publication date

28.06.2023

Number of characters

30301

Cite

GOST	, J. Savulescu's "The God Machine" as a Moral Agent and the Problem of Responsibility // Chelovek – 2023. – V. 34. – Issue 3 C. 24-40 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://chelovek-journal.ru/S023620070026101-8-1 (circulation date: 13.02.2025). DOI: 10.31857/S023620070026101-8
MLA	, , , "J. Savulescu's "The God Machine" as a Moral Agent and the Problem of Responsibility." Chelovek 34.3 (2023):24-40. DOI: 10.31857/S023620070026101-8
APA	, (2023). J. Savulescu's "The God Machine" as a Moral Agent and the Problem of Responsibility. Chelovek 34(3), pp.24-40 DOI: 10.31857/S023620070026101-8

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