A sharp reversal of the Chinese vector of the US foreign policy inevitably came with the election of Donald Trump to the presidency in 2017, whose entire election campaign was accompanied by accentuated anti-Chinese rhetoric.

Beijing’s response to the powerful pressure of the Trump administration was not the curtailment of state industrial development programs (Made in China – 2025, etc.) required by Washington, but the proclamation of a course to ensure the country’s economic security, increase the level of technological self-sufficiency, further strengthen the role of the domestic market and reduce dependence on exports. In particular, the latest provisions were included in the “double circulation” policy adopted in October 2020.

By now, Washington has imposed on China, though sensitive, still limited sanctions which generally do not have a significant impact on the socio-economic development of the country. Even with the WH’s firm political will, effective sanctions potential of the US against China is significantly limited due to enormous interdependence of the two largest world economies.

In general, the US sanctions of recent years against China can be divided into two large blocks: officially justified by the interests of US national security (restrictions on telecommunications companies, the ban of Chinese software, etc.) and related to accusations of human rights violations (restrictions on Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of the PRC and Hong Kong SAR). However, in some cases the real reason for the restrictions imposed is the desire of the United States to contain China in the context of general political, economic and technological rivalry of the two countries.