A Compatibilist Refutation of the Four Case Manipulation Argument

Pereboom's 'Four Case' manipulation argument is intended to show that compatibilist criteria of moral responsibility are not sufficient, because there can be agents who meet these criteria, but lack moral responsibility. This argument is one of the most influential incompatibilist arguments in contemporary debate on compatibility of moral responsibility and physical determinism.

I review the structure of the argument, the criticism of the argument by several compatibilist philosophers, and Pereboom’s defense against this criticism. After that I show that two different strategies of compatibilist criticism, the so called ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ replies, make the premises and the conclusion of the argument less plausible, although neither of them is sufficient to refute the argument. In the final part of the art cle I demonstrate how the combination of these strategies refutes Pereboom's 'Four Case' manipulation argument.

Keywords

'Four Case' manipulation argument, Derk Pereboom, compatibilism, moral responsibility

Acknowledgment

Research has been conducted with financial support from Russian Science Foundation grant (project No. 18-18-00222).

Received

20.12.2018

Publication date

20.12.2018

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GOST	Sekatskaya M. A Compatibilist Refutation of the 'Four Case' Manipulation Argument // Voprosy filosofii – 2018. – Issue 12 C. 185-196 [Electronic resource]. URL: http://ras.jes.su/vphil/s207987840001750-4-1-en (circulation date: 05.11.2024). DOI: 10.31857/S004287440002600-5
MLA	Sekatskaya, Maria A "A Compatibilist Refutation of the 'Four Case' Manipulation Argument." Voprosy filosofii 12 (2018):185-196. DOI: 10.31857/S004287440002600-5
APA	Sekatskaya M. (2018). A Compatibilist Refutation of the 'Four Case' Manipulation Argument. Voprosy filosofii (12), pp.185-196 DOI: 10.31857/S004287440002600-5

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