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Сhina and the states of the Korean peninsula in 2022 – before and after Yoon Seok Yeol
 
PIIS086919080025672-6-1
DOI10.31857/S086919080025672-6
Publication type Article
Status Published
Authors
Konstantin Asmolov 
Occupation: Leading Research Fellow
Affiliation: Institute of China and Contemporary Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Address: Russian Federation, Moscow
Journal nameVostok. Afro-Aziatskie obshchestva: istoriia i sovremennost
EditionIssue 3
Pages162-172
AbstractChina’s relations with the DPRK have been steadily developing since 2018: at every opportunity, PRC & DPRK emphasize the unbreakable friendship based on an alliance of socialist parties. North Korean diplomats and the media constantly speak out in support of Beijing’s course, criticizing the US’ accusations, and China calls for taking into account the North Korean position on the nuclear issue. Conducting a nuclear test may cool down the relations between the two countries, but Beijing’s specific reaction will depend on the foreign policy situation and will not necessarily be reduced to condemnation, similar to the situation in 2017. Relations between China and the Republic of Korea have not yet undergone any significant changes, despite the change of power in Seoul. China is the country’s leading economic partner, but the United States remains the main security ally and ideological sovereign, which forces the Republic of Korea to maneuver. President Yoon Suk-yeol, representing the conservatives, despite his pro-American rhetoric, is trying to continue the policy of “balancing” and avoid spoiling relations with Beijing, except for the separation on the issue of so-called “three NO’s” (no additional deployment of THAAD in South Korea beyond the existing one, no participation in the US regional missile defense system and no participation in a trilateral military alliance with the US and Japan). However, President Yoon is under strong political pressure, both internal & external, and against the backdrop of increased confrontation between the United States and China, his reversal from China seems quite inevitable in the medium term.
KeywordsChina-DPRK relations, DPRK-ROK relations, balancing policy, escalation of tension
Received19.06.2023
Publication date02.07.2023
Number of characters21922
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Table of contents

Исторический очерк
КНР – КНДР: союз перед лицом общей угрозы
Политика Юн Сок Ёля на китайском направлении
1 Отмечаемые в турбулентном 2022 г. 30 лет дипломатических отношений между КНР и РК – хороший повод оценить текущее состояние дел как между Пекином и Сеулом, так и между Пекином и Пхеньяном на фоне усиления противостояния США и КНР. В качестве событий, рассматриваемых как оказывающие влияние на отношения Китая и двух Корей, часто выделяют третий срок Си Цзиньпина и смену власти в Республике Корея, где президентом стал представитель Консерваторов Юн Сок Ёль.
2 Задача данного материала – дать краткий рассказ о предшествующих временах, оценить текущее положение дел с точки зрения того, поменялись ли тренды, и описать перспективы развития отношений трех стран.
3

Исторический очерк
4 До определённого времени отношения между Сеулом и Пекином во многом были построены на дружеских отношениях между Си Цзиньпином и Пак Кын Хе. Визит Си в РК в июле 2014 г. был важным шагом в укреплении связей двух стран.
5 Ситуация стала меняться к худшему в 2016 г., когда под давлением США и на фоне ядерного испытания КНДР президент Пак Кын Хе приняла решение о размещении на территории РК американской ПРО THAAD, направленной как против Севера, так и (из-за особенностей действия как ракет, так и радаров) Китая. После этого против РК были введены неформальные санкции, которые очень больно ударили как по позициям южнокорейского бизнеса в Китае, так и по проникновению туда южнокорейского культурного контента.
6 При этом охлаждение отношений с РК не сопровождалось улучшением отношений с КНДР – в 2016–2017 гг. после проведения ядерных испытаний Пекин присоединился к весьма жёстким санкциям, наложенным СБ ООН.
7 «Революция свечей», которая закончилась импичментом Пак Кын Хе и приходом к власти Демократической партии во главе с Мун Чжэ Ином, несколько изменила ситуацию благодаря неформальной договорённости о т. н. трёх нет: никакого дополнительного размещения THAAD в Южной Корее сверх существующего, никакого участия в региональной системе противоракетной обороны США и никакого участия в трехстороннем военном союзе с США и Японией.
8 Тем не менее возвращения ситуации к прежнему уровню так и не произошло. Неформальные ограничения были смягчены, но экономические и культурные связи так и не были восстановлены до предшествовавшего уровня, и это начало формировать как в правительственных кругах, так и в широких массах определённый ресентимент.
9 Положение осложнялось растущим соперничеством США и КНР, на фоне которого РК формально оказалась перед выбором между главным союзником в сфере безопасности, идеологическим сувереном и ведущим торговым партнёром, который уже показал возможную меру своего неудовольствия.
10 Здесь, однако, стоит отметить два важных момента. Во-первых, с точки зрения ценностей, сформированных образованием, вероисповеданием и политико-культурным контекстом, южнокорейская элита прочно ориентирована на США вне зависимости от политических взглядов. Во-вторых, хотя консервативная оппозиция постоянно обвиняла Муна в прокитайской политике, никаких серьёзных уступок Пекину за вычетом «трёх нет» сделано не было. Более того, в последние годы правления Мун Чжэ Ина можно было отметить резкий рост синофобии, в раздувании которой принимали деятельное участие не только консервативные НГО, но и вполне проправительственные эксперты [Асмолов, 2022].

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