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The Origins of the Reformist Faction in Iran: the Political Isolation and Ideological Transformation of the Islamic Left in the 1990s
 
PIIS086919080014834-4-1
DOI10.31857/S086919080014834-4
Publication type Article
Status Published
Authors
Ilhom Kh. Mirzoev 
Occupation: Research assistant
Affiliation: Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences
Address: Russian Federation, Moscow
Journal nameVostok. Afro-Aziatskie obshchestva: istoriia i sovremennost
EditionIssue 1
Pages164-172
Abstract

This article attempts to comprehend the process of moderation of the Islamic Left – the progenitor-faction of the Reformists. In the changed global context and socio-political landscape of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the 1990s, the Islamic Left could not rapidly adapt to the new environment which diminished their appeal among the constituency. The erosion of public trust enabled the Right to push their rivals aside using the Guardian Council as a political filter, and soon the Left found themselves on the margins of mainstream politics. However, during this enforced isolation, they managed to reassess their post-revolutionary experience, and their political platform underwent a significant transformation. The new think-tanks and intellectual circles, most notably the Center for Strategic Studies and the “Keyan” circle, played an instrumental role in this process. Within this intellectual infrastructure, a new religious and political discourse emerged, providing argumentation for a rethinking of R. Khomeini's legacy from the standpoint of republicanism. Then the elitist language and vague ideas of this discourse were politicized and disseminated through the network of like-minded media. The slogans of the “New Left” gained wide support among the youth and the urban middle class, who advocated the development of political pluralism and the continuation of the course of economic liberalization and detente, which had begun during the tenure of the President A.A. Hashemi-Rafsanjani (1989–1997). These strata formed the core social forces that ensured the victory of Mohammad Khatami in the 1997 presidential elections, and then supported the Reformist “May 23rd Front”.

KeywordsIslamic Republic of Iran, factionalism, political history, Islamic Left, Reformists
Received26.01.2022
Publication date07.03.2022
Number of characters23905
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Table of contents

THE SPLIT WITHIN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY AND THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE AFTER THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1980–1988)
THE EXPULSION OF THE ISLAMIC LEFT
THE IDEOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION
1 In the absence of a proper party system, factionalism lies at the heart of the interplay between the main political camps of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Along with the intricate state structure, factionalism delineates the contours of intra-elite competition and decision-making. Although there are no conventionally accepted designations of these factions, due to their fluctuant and accommodative ideological stances, presently, the IRI political spectrum is generally divided into four sectors: the Ultra-Conservatives, the Conservatives, The Moderates (Pragmatists), and Reformists. It should be noted that such composition is a result of the IRI political evolution since 1979 which has witnessed ideological differentiation, shifting alliances, and alteration of factions’ political platforms. In particular, members of the now-Reformist faction have undergone by far the most profound transformation, switching from bellicose Islamists in the 1980s to conciliative Democrats towards the end of the 1990s. This article explores the political genealogy of the Reformists with a focus on the process of moderation of their progenitor-faction – the Islamic Left. We outline the Islamic Left’s political path, conceptualize their political isolation, and examine the intellectual network that harbored their ideological transformation.
2

THE SPLIT WITHIN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY AND THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE AFTER THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1980–1988)
3 In the course of the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the ensued period of a power struggle between various groups of the anti-Shah coalition, the Islamists had forced their political rivals out and gained full control over the Islamic Republic. However, the actual governing experience and adjustments of the new state soon proved to be a bone of contention among the post-revolutionary elites with the Parliament (Majles) being the main arena of ideological and political battles between rival camps. Concurrently, competing policy visions lead to the formation of the left and right wings of the Islamic Republican Party, which was created immediately after the Revolution and served for the Islamists as a bulwark against other groups. The Right chiefly represented the interests of large bazaari traders and higher clergy, opposed state interference in the economy, advocated the protection of private property, and were committed to strict observance of Sharia norms in the socio-cultural sphere. The Left mostly attracted the middle-rank clerics, radical student revolutionaries, and lower classes. They promoted more egalitarian economic policies, favored government redistribution of income, espoused less puritanical views on socio-cultural life, and argued for the export of the Islamic Revolution [Ravandi-Fadai, 2001, p. 71]. Apart from diverging opinions on economy and politics, the factions differed in their theological views as well. The Right adhered to a traditional reading of feqh1, while the Left championed more dynamic and flexible interpretation. Furthermore, both flanks tried to legitimize their economic programs from the standpoint of Islamic law, accusing each other of supporting "American (capitalist)" or "communist" Islam respectively [Ayatollahi Tabaar, 2018, p. 207]. The endless debates over the land reform, taxes, state control over foreign trade and other economic issues had led to a stalemate between the right-dominated Guardian Council and the left-leaning Majles which virtually brought functioning of the state apparatus to a halt [Dunaeva, 2013, p. 33]. The competing factions were so intractable, that Ruhollah Khomeini, the Supreme Leader, often had to interfere himself to set the wheels of the state machine in motion. Eventually, R. Khomeini decided to suspend the activities of the IRP at the suggestion of then-president and party secretary Ali Khamenei and Majles speaker Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani on June 2nd, 1987 which was tantamount to the party’s effective dissolution [Movafeqat…, 1987]. The organizational separation of the IRP opposing flanks into the right-wing Combatant Clergy Society (CCS) and its left splinter Combatant Clergy Association (CCA) along with the end of the deadly Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) and the death of R. Khomeini (1989) provided the opportunity for recalibration of foreign policy and shifts in domestic power alignment. In broad terms, the end of the 1980s could be characterized as the beginning of the “rationalization” of the legacy of the Islamic Revolution. Iran's leadership had gradually moved from revolutionary utopianism and radicalism to more realistic and pragmatic political practice both in internal affairs and in interaction with other countries. In this vein, the devastating Iran-Iraq War had a sobering effect on the proponents of the export of Revolution, while the most radical groups were pushed aside or eliminated in the post-revolutionary turmoil [Kozhanov, Bogacheva, 2020, p. 153]. Furthermore, Khomeini’s interpretation of the velayat-e faqih concept – a founding doctrine of the IRI – also gained a more mundane perspective. The utmost importance was now placed on the expediency of the state system even to the detriment of Islamic ordinances, with the Supreme Leader’s religious authority yielding precedence to his political function. After the death of R. Khomeini the state system was headed by the right-wing tandem – Ali Khamenei became Khomeini’s successor, while A.A. Hashemi-Rafsanjani replaced him as President. The main task facing the new leadership was to restore the country’s economy after the Iran-Iraq War so the course of stateization, which prevailed in the 1980s under the predominance of the left wing of the IRP, was replaced by a course towards building a market economy. Rafsanjani’s administration formulated the First Five-year Development Plan (1989–1994) which provided for inter alia liberalization of internal and external trade, export capacity growth, inducement of foreign investment, partial privatization, the establishment of free-trade zones, and refusal to subsidize unprofitable enterprises [Mamedova, 1997, p. 96]. After months of controversial disputes in the Majles, the Plan was eventually adopted in January 1990 and laid the legal basis for the country’s new economic program. Rafsanjani’s party fellows from CCS, though initially supportive of the reforms project, became wary of the detente foreign policy amidst the United States’ international hegemony after the collapse of the USSR. Moreover, they perceived the President’s course as a deviation from the ideals of the Revolution and soon took a more conservative and increasingly reactionary stance particularly during his second tenure (1993–1997), putting the matter of expediency of alliance with the Conservatives into question for Rafsanjani. Given that almost every action of the government was beset by an outburst of disaffection on the conservative side, the integrity of the reforms was inevitably sacrificed to the transient demands of the inter-factional struggle and political trade-off. The results were corresponding to such halfway reforms – the privatization process proceeded slowly and was limited to the sale of ordinary shares to private investors and large funds while maintaining state control, and a short period of increased economic growth ended with the onset of the debt crisis in the mid-1990s [Hakimian, Karshenas, 2005, p. 69,74]. 1. Feqh – muslim jurisprudence, the science of interpretaion and application of the legal, moral, ethical and practical tenets of the Qur’an and Sunnah by competent legal scholars.

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