U.S.-Russian relations in a new era

 
PIIS032120680003607-1-1
DOI10.31857/S032120680003607-1
Publication type Article
Status Published
Authors
Occupation: Managing Director
Affiliation: Kissinger Associates, Inc.
Address: USA, New York
Journal nameUSA & Canada: ekonomika, politika, kultura
EditionIssue 1
Pages76-89
Abstract

The article looks into the current state of Russian-American relations, which have entered a new period after the events of 2014 in Ukraine. Many experts compare the situation with the Cold War, but the actual state of international relations is very different. Russia and the U.S. are no longer ideological opponents; their relations are no longer decisive to global affairs. U.S.-Russian relations have remained highly competitive in nature since the end of the 19-th century. Both countries employ contradictive ways of national expansion and providing national security. They also have differing values, which define competing forms of exceptionalism and universalism. This leads to incompatibility of their views on the world order: Russia aspires to a Westphalian world with spheres of influence rules by the great powers united by mutual interest and understanding, whereas the U.S. prefers an open rules-based order with no spheres of influence. Russia is also deeply concerned about America's inclination towards a unipolar world, dominated by the United States. In the short term, the main challenges in the bilateral relations will remain European security, the Middle East, strategic stability and sanctions. In the long term they will be shaped by certain global trends, such as power shift from the West to the East, technological advancement, raise of transnational challenges, such as extremism, international crime, proliferation of dangerous technologies, climate change and the raise of the multipolar world, with the U.S., China, Russia, India, Japan, and some European powers as key players. The key challenge for Russia remains its lagging behind the world leaders in crucial areas of development. For the U.S., it is its tiredness of the burden of global leadership. In the future, America will likely to perceive itself as just one of the world leaders. Its grand strategy will remain U.S. preeminence in the Western hemisphere; neither Europe nor East Asia nor the Middle East dominated by a hostile power; safe maritime trade routes. Russia's grand strategy is likely to include Russian preeminence in the former Soviet space; the prevention of the emergence of a unified Europe balancing economic ties between Europe and East Asia; the erection of a reliable barrier against Middle Eastern extremism; and resistance to the rise of a single dominating power in global affairs. There is a strong need for U.S.-Russian cooperation in dealing with the rise of China, European affairs, the Middle East, the Arctic as well as strategic stability issues. The future world order is likely to shift towards a concert of great powers, preferred by Russia.

KeywordsU.S.-Russian relations, world order, exceptionalism, universalism, expansion, values, national security, strategic competition, global leadership, Cold War, multipolar world, global trends
Received28.01.2019
Publication date28.01.2019
Number of characters42953
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1 The post Cold-War period in US-Russian relations ended abruptly in March 2014 with the eruption of the Ukraine crisis. The United States finally abandoned the waning aspiration to slowly integrate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic community that had driven its Russia policy since the end of the Cold War. Russia demonstrated its willingness to flout the norms that had governed European security since the signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975 to protect its vital national interests. Talk of partnership vanished; channels of communication were severed. Each country now clearly viewed the other as a strategic competitor. That point was made explicit in the US National Security Strategy released in December 2017. Russian President Vladimir Putin had repeatedly made it with increasing vehemence since his remarks at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007.
2 This does not mean, as many commentators argue, that a new cold war has broken out, even if relations are at their lowest ebb since the early 1980’s, one of the darkest periods of the original Cold War. The international context and the nature of relations are radically different. The distribution of power in the world is no longer bipolar as it was during the Cold War. Rather, the contours of an inchoate multipolar system are emerging. The two countries are no longer engaged in a global existential struggle of two diametrically opposed philosophies of man and the state. Rather, both countries oversee variations of a capitalist economic system and profess adherence to democracy. US-Russian relations no longer structure the international system or dominate the global agenda. Rather, they are among many other bilateral and multilateral relationships that shape the system and agenda, and not necessarily the most consequential. And Russia no longer lies at the center of American foreign policy, even if the United States remains a top priority for Russia. Rather, the United States is focused on other matters, including China and international terrorism. The new National Security Strategy does not change the picture, even if it identifies Russia as a revisionist power and strategic competitor, for the strategy also identifies China in the same terms and names Iran, North Korea, and international terrorism as major threats.
3 As in the Cold War, however, relations will remain troubled for a considerable period, defined more by competition, at times verging on outright confrontation, than cooperation. In the near term, there can be no return to the hope for partnership of the immediate post-Cold War years, no new reset, and no rapid improvement in relations even if the intensity of estrangement might abate. The differences - over the principles of world order, the essence of regional conflicts, and the fundamental values that should inform political affairs - are too profound for it to be otherwise.
4 How long this period of strategic competition will last is an open question, as is the evolution of US-Russian relations to mid-century. Much will depend on domestic developments and global trends. The future could bring indifference - because one or the other country ceases to figure large in world affairs - or, if both countries continue to matter, permanent confrontation, strategic competition, or strategic cooperation with far-reaching global implications.
5

The Burden of History

 

 That US-Russian relations are competitive should not come as a surprise. That has been their prevailing character since the United States emerged as a global power at the end of the 19th century. Then, the United States and the Russian Empire, along with Japan, were competing for influence in Manchuria. In 1904, in the early phases of the Russo-Japanese War, the United States in Realpolitikk fashion tilted toward what it thought was the weaker power, Japan. It shifted position only after Japan humiliated Russia on both land and sea, mediating a peace to create a favorable balance of power in Northeast Asia. After the First World War, the United States refused to recognize the new Bolshevik regime because of its subversive, anti-capitalist foreign policy, relenting only in 1933, as the Nazi storm clouds were gathering over Europe and Japanese imperialism began to threaten US interests in East Asia and the Pacific. After the Second World War, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a bitter cold war, which brought them to the cusp of thermonuclear conflict during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

6 Even the rare times of cooperation were less compelling than might appear at first glance. The victorious alliance against Nazi Germany, for example, was laced with deep suspicion. Russia and the United States fought not so much in common as in parallel on the eastern and western fronts, respectively. The post-war settlement divided Europe into two opposing camps that quickly found themselves in the grips of a cold war. More recently, the cooperation in the first post-Soviet decade was grounded less in common strategic interests than a weak Russia’s timid acquiescence in US actions it found objectionable, such as the US intervention in the Balkan wars and NATO expansion. Any pretense of cooperation began to wither away as Russia regained its strength under Putin in the 2000’s, to be ultimately replaced by the present profound estrangement.

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1. For World Bank GDP data, see https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=CN-RU-US and https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.PP.CD?locations=CN-RU-US.

2. See URaskhody na NIOKR vyshli tolTko summoyF [R&D expenditures are insufficient], kommer-sant.ru, July 26,2018 (https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3695542).

3. See Olga Kuvshinova and Aleksandra Prokopenko, UYeshche 20 let stagnatsii prognoziruyet MinekonomrazvitiyaF [The Ministry of Economic Development forecasts a further 20 years of stagnation], Vedomosti, October 20, 2016 at https://www.vedomosti.ru/economics/articles/2016/10/20/661689-20-let-stagnatsii.

4. See https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS?locations=CN-RU-US-IN; http://uis.unesco.org/en/news/rd-data-release; and http://data.uis.unesco.org

5. See Pew Research Center, UPublic Uncertain, Divided Over AmericaTs Place in the World,F May 5, 2016 (http://www.people-press.org/2016/05/05/public-uncertain-divided-over-americas-place-in-the-world/).

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