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Editorial Preface
 
Title (other)Предисловие редактора
PIIS271326680024069-5-1
Publication type Miscellaneous
Status Published
Authors
Luca Forgione 
Affiliation: University of Basilicata
Address: Italy
Journal nameStudies in Transcendental Philosophy
EditionVolume 3 Issue 3
Abstract

      

Keywords
Received16.11.2022
Publication date29.12.2022
Number of characters14241
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1 In the famous first paragraph of the Anthropology Kant draws attention to both concepts of ‘person’ and ‘unity of consciousness’, i.e., the transcendental apperception expressed by the representation ‘I’, and links the moral and theoretical aspects of his philosophical approach in order to consider the human being infinitely above all other living beings on Earth: “The fact that the human being can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person, and by virtue of the unity of consciousness through all changes that happen to him, one and the same person - i.e., through rank and dignity an entirely different being from things, such as irrational animals, with which one can do as one likes” (Anth 7: 127, 15).
2 As Kant said in his major works of the critical period, it is due to the ‘simple’ and ‘empty’ representation ‘I think’ that the subject’s capacity for self-consciousness enables the subject to represent its own mental dimension, as well as itself as one and the same subject through all changes. More specifically, the subjective capacity to represent itself through the representation I can be articulated on the basis of the principle of the necessary synthetic unity of apperception. The synthetic unity of apperception must be regarded not only as the supreme principle in the whole of human cognition (B135) and the objective condition of all cognition (B138), but also as the only principle whereby an exhaustive account of basic self-consciousness can possibly be developed.
3 The double nature of apperception – regarded as the principle of both human cognition and basic self-consciousness – stays at a particularly high level of generality, every perception or experience has the same form as an encounter between subject and object. At the same time, the principle obviously touches on the huge philosophical field of self-knowledge, which is concerned with the knowledge of one’s own mental states, e.g., the knowledge of one’s current experiences, thoughts, beliefs or desires. Kant inspired the rationalist theory of self-knowledge: Agential self-knowledge is related to the subject’s knowledge of her own rational agency considered as the thinking subject’s activity since the subject is conscious of her existence as an intelligence based on her power of combination.
4

In this issue of Studies in Transcendental Philosophy five scholars enquire about the theoretical aspects of Kant’s transcendental philosophy related to the notions of subject, self-consciousness, and self-knowledge. Andrew Brook examines Kant’s views on transcendental apperception at the end of the Critical Period, focusing on Opus Postumum which contains some of Kant’s most important reflections on the subjective dimension. As is known, the self-conscious act designated by the proposition ‘I think’ is an act of spontaneity, and this spontaneity is the reason that the subject calls itself an intelligence. In his article Addison Ellis examines the theoretical and practical dimension of spontaneity, calling into question the distinction between a merely ‘relative’ spontaneity and one that is ‘absolute’. Luca Forgione points to two forms of self-consciousness introduced by Kant: inner sense, based on a sensory form of self-awareness, and transcendental apperception. Through the notion of inner sense, Kant also allows for an introspective account of self-awareness; nonetheless, Kant holds an utterly sophisticated notion of basic self-consciousness provided for by the notion of transcendental apperception. Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira’s article presents a systematic and a historical approach, linking the contemporary debate on transcendental argument to Kant’s philosophy. It addresses both Stroud’s objection and Strawson’s perspective on transcendental argument and introduces a new reconstruction of Kant’s Refutation as successful truth-directed transcendental argument. In contrast to the contemporary movement of transhumanism and its claims that creatures like us can exist independently of our bodies, Robert Hanna develops a generalist perspective on the subjective dimension, according to which all rational human creature are synthetic a priori necessarily, essentially embodied Kantian selves.
5 I would like to thank the authors for participating in this issue and for helping to make it really special.
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Bibliography:

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Allison, H.E. (2004) Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. An Interpretation and Defense. Revised and Enlarged Edition. New Haven and London: Yale University Press;
8 Ameriks, K. (2000) Kant’s Theory of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press;
9 Brook, A. (1994) Kant and the Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University;
10 Press Carl, W. (1997) Apperception and spontaneity. International Journal of Philosophical Studies. 5 (2): 147–163;
11 Capozzi, M. (2007) "L’io e la conoscenza di sé in Kant,” in E. Canone (a c.di), Per una storia del concetto di mente. Firenze: Olschki;

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1. Allison, H.E. (2004) Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. An Interpretation and Defense. Revised and Enlarged Edition. New Haven and London: Yale University Press;
2. Ameriks, K. (2000) Kant’s Theory of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press;
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4. Press Carl, W. (1997) Apperception and spontaneity. International Journal of Philosophical Studies. 5 (2): 147–163;
5. Capozzi, M. (2007) "L’io e la conoscenza di sé in Kant,” in E. Canone (a c.di), Per una storia del concetto di mente. Firenze: Olschki;
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27. Van Cleve, J. (1999) Problems from Kant. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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