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“Relative” Spontaneity and Reason’s Self-Knowledge
 
Title (other)«Относительная» спонтанность и самопознание разума
PIIS271326680024028-0-1
DOI10.18254/S271326680024028-0
Publication type Article
Status Published
Authors
Addison Ellis 
Affiliation: American University, Cairo
Address: Egypt, Cairo
Journal nameStudies in Transcendental Philosophy
EditionVolume 3 Issue 3
Abstract

Kant holds that the whole “higher faculty of knowledge” (‘reason’ or ‘understanding’ in a broad sense), is a spontaneous faculty. But what could this mean? It seems that it could either be a perfectly innocent claim or a very dangerous one. The innocent thought is that reason is spontaneous because it is not wholly passive, not just a slave to what bombards the senses. If so, then the rejection of Hume’s radical empiricism would suffice for Kant’s claim. But the dangerous thought is that reason, and the ‘I think’ which expresses it, is free, having the power to produce something entirely from itself. While this freedom is characteristic of practical reason, could it be characteristic of reason in general, even in its theoretical employment? Some contemporary interpreters have admirably defended the ‘dangerous’ conception by stripping it of the implication that it makes reason in general entirely self-sufficient. I attempt to add to this effort. However, what I contend is that this weightier conception of spontaneity (‘absolute’ or ‘non-relative’ spontaneity) requires abandoning a certain approach to the question that has been assumed by virtually everyone in the debate—namely, that the question can be answered by siding with either the so-called ‘metaphysical’ or the ‘epistemic’ interpreters of Kant. My goal is to suggest that the proper perspective on reason’s spontaneity resists such characterizations all together, and thereby resists any of the conditions under which it could be understood as ‘relative’ to anything.

Abstract (other)

Кант считает, что «высшая способность познания» («разум» или «рассудок» в широком смысле) является спонтанной способностью. Что это может означать? Это может быть как совершенно невинным утверждением, так и очень опасным. «Невинная» мысль заключается в том, что разум спонтанен, потому что он не полностью пассивен, не просто раб того, что атакует наши органы чувств. Если это так, то для утверждения Канта достаточно отказа от радикального эмпиризма Юма. «Опасная» же мысль заключается в том, что разум, и выражающее его «я мыслю», свободен и обладает способностью производить нечто исключительно из самого себя. Эта свобода характерна для практического разума, но может ли она быть характерна для разума вообще, включая его теоретическое применение? Некоторые современные интерпретаторы с восхищением защищают «опасную» концепцию, не обращая внимания на то следствие, что она делает разум в целом полностью самодостаточным. Я поддерживаю эти усилия, однако при этом я утверждаю, что более взвешенная концепция спонтанности («абсолютная» или «безотносительная» спонтанность) требует отказа от определенного подхода к вопросу, который предполагался практически всеми участниками дебатов, а именно, что на этот вопрос можно ответить, став на сторону так называемой «метафизической» или «эпистемической» интерпретации Канта. Моя цель состоит в предположении, что правильная понимание «спонтанности» разума противостоит этим подходам, и тем самым противостоит любым условиям, при которых она может быть понята как «относительная» по отношению к чему-либо.

Keywordsreason, understanding, spontaneity, self-knowledge, transcendental freedom
Keywords list (other)разум, понимание, спонтанность, самопознание, трансцендентальная свобода
Received19.10.2022
Publication date29.12.2022
Number of characters44436
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Table of contents

The Spontaneity of Critique
Absolute and Relative Spontaneity: What’s the Problem?
Troubles with Drawing the Absolute-Relative Distinction
Kant’s Non-Relative Account of Understanding’s Spontaneity
From Formal to Material Knowledge
Spontaneity as the Self-Conscious Epigenesis of Pure Reason
Spontaneity as the ‘Transcendental Freedom’ of the Understanding?
Conclusion
1

The Spontaneity of Critique
2 Kant holds that the whole “higher faculty of knowledge” (‘reason’ or ‘understanding’ in a broad sense), is a spontaneous faculty.1 Readers of the Critique of Pure Reason will find the most common expression of this point in Kant’s claim that the self-conscious act ‘I think’ is one of spontaneity (B133), and that this spontaneity is even “the reason that I call myself an intelligence” (B158n.). But what could this mean? It seems, at a first glance, that it could either be a perfectly innocent claim or a very dangerous one. The innocent thought is that reason is spontaneous because it is not wholly passive, not just a slave to what bombards the senses. If so, then the rejection of Hume’s radical empiricism would suffice for Kant’s claim. But the dangerous thought is that reason, and the ‘I think’ which expresses it, is free, having the power to produce something entirely from itself. While this freedom is characteristic of practical reason, could it be characteristic of reason in general, even in its theoretical employment? 1. Kant calls ‘pure reason’ “cognition from a priori principles” (KU 5: 167), and he identifies ‘pure reason’ as “the higher faculty of cognition” (KU 20: 201) and “the entire higher faculty of cognition” (A835/B863). See Preface B of the Critique for Kant’s interchangeable use of ‘reason’ and ‘understanding’, particularly with respect to being a faculty of logical cognition which has to do with nothing but itself (KrV Bix-x).
3 This is what some consider to be the distinction between a merely ‘relative’ and an ‘absolute’ spontaneity. Because the radical sounding ‘absolute’ thesis seems opposed to one of Kant’s most foundational claims—that knowledge is a cooperation of an active intellectual faculty and a receptive sensible faculty—most Kant interpreters will attribute to him the relative spontaneity thesis. But a few have challenged this approach, particularly in recent years. Indeed, not to suggest that reason may be self-sufficient—for this would indeed be incompatible with Kant’s aims—but to suggest that reason must be something more than an active-passive hybrid of sorts if we are to understand what it is to have rational control of and to take responsibility for what we judge.2 What follows will be an attempt to add to this effort. However, what I contend is that this weightier conception of spontaneity requires abandoning a certain approach to the question that has been assumed by virtually everyone in the debate—namely, that the question can be answered by siding with either the so-called ‘metaphysical’ or the ‘epistemic’ interpreters of Kant. My goal is to suggest that the proper perspective on reason’s spontaneity resists such characterizations all together, and thereby resists any of the conditions under which it could be understood as ‘relative’ to anything. 2. For example, see Pippin 1987, Allison 1990, Ellis 2017, McLear 2020.
4 Let us begin with a quick overview of this concept of spontaneity as it pertains to reason in the Critique. Kant’s initial gloss is that spontaneity is a capacity’s ability to bring forth representations from itself (A51/B75). The capacity of reason in a rational being is therefore spontaneous insofar as this capacity brings forth its own representations. A study of the Critique reveals that this notion of spontaneity both opens as well as closes the book. We already find traces of it in the Preface, especially where Kant indicates that the ‘reason’ which is the subject of critique is also the one who performs it (Axi-xii). This theme returns in the Doctrine of Method: “Reason must subject itself to critique in all its undertakings, and cannot restrict the freedom of critique through any prohibition […] The very existence of reason depends upon this freedom, which has no dictatorial authority, but whose claim is never anything more than the agreement of free citizens […]” (A738-39/B766-67, emphasis added).
5 Kant calls this self-adjudication of reason self-knowledge (Selbsterkenntnis), and it is within this framework of reason’s self-knowledge that the entire Critique plays out, including the elaboration of the sensible conditions required for theoretical knowledge, of the transcendental principles of such knowledge, and of the self-knowledge required for recognizing the illusions that are endemic to reason. If so, then Kant’s innovative insight here is that reason’s determinations are no gift; reason is the source of its own determinations. Since knowledge is the exercise of reason, it is the determination of and by reason. Reason is thereby spontaneous, and its acts of knowing are spontaneously determined.
6 So, the topic of the spontaneity of reason is the topic of reason’s self-determination. At this highest point of pure reason—the point at which reason critiques itself—reason dismisses its “groundless pretensions” and secures its “rightful claims” (Axi-xii). Reason’s determination of just what counts as rightful possession or mere pretension involves its knowing why this is so. If Kant is right, then reason gives itself determinations in no other way than by cognizing those determinations. Reason is spontaneous because it is self-determining, which is to say that it is self-knowing.
7 But then spontaneity describes not just a property attaching to the faculty of reason; it describes the faculty of reason itself.3 Reason is spontaneity and spontaneity is reason. This would be a way of understanding Kant’s two pivotal and most often cited statements regarding spontaneity at A50-51/B74-75: 3. Hence why Kant not only characterizes particular acts of judging as spontaneous acts, but also the capacity of understanding itself as spontaneity (A51/B75). The most straightforward way of reading this is to say that ‘spontaneous act’ just means ‘an act brought forth spontaneously—viz., through a spontaneous capacity’.

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15. Sgarbi, Marco (2012) Kant on Spontaneity. London: Continuum Books.

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