Dangerous Youth: why Do Political Uprisings Take an Unarmed Form?

Affiliation:
National Research University “Higher School of Economics”
Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
Address: Moscow, Russia

Yu. Zinkina

Affiliation:
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration
Lomonosov Moscow State University
Address: Moscow, Russia

Andrey Korotayev

Affiliation:
National Research University “Higher School of Economics”
Institute for African Studies RAS
Address: Moscow, Russia

Journal name

Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya

Edition

Issue 5

Pages

82-96

Abstract

Quantitative cross-national studies of the factors of violent (armed) versus nonviolent (unarmed) revolutionary events are very few, and they do not pay enough attention to such a powerful factor as a high proportion of young people in the total adult population – the “youth bulge”. We assume that (1) revolutionary uprisings in countries with a greater youth bulge will be significantly more likely to take armed form than in countries with a significantly lower value of this indicator. We also assume that (2) the higher the median age of the population, the higher the likelihood for a revolutionary uprising take an unarmed character. In general, both of our hypotheses are fully confirmed. Thus, there is a reason to believe that the significant increase in the median age of the population observed at the global level in the recent decades could have contributed to a noticeable decrease in the share of armed revolutionary uprisings and an increase in the share of unarmed ones.

Keywords

youth bulge, median age, political instability, violent revolutionary uprisings, nonviolent revolutionary uprisings

Acknowledgment

The research was a part of the HSE Basic Research Program in 2023 with the support of the Russian Science Foundation (Project No. 21-18-00123).

Received

30.05.2023

Publication date

12.07.2023

Number of characters

26072

Cite

GOST	Ustyzhanin V., Zinkina Y., Korotayev A. Dangerous Youth: why Do Political Uprisings Take an Unarmed Form? // Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya – 2023. – Issue 5 C. 82-96 [Electronic resource]. URL: http://ras.jes.su/socis/s013216250025805-8-1-en (circulation date: 18.05.2024). DOI: 10.31857/S013216250025805-8
MLA	Ustyzhanin, Vadim V, Zinkina, Yu, Korotayev, Andrey "Dangerous Youth: why Do Political Uprisings Take an Unarmed Form?." Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya 5 (2023):82-96. DOI: 10.31857/S013216250025805-8
APA	Ustyzhanin V., Zinkina Y., Korotayev A. (2023). Dangerous Youth: why Do Political Uprisings Take an Unarmed Form?. Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya (5), pp.82-96 DOI: 10.31857/S013216250025805-8

100 rub.

When subscribing to an article or issue, the user can download PDF, evaluate the publication or contact the author. Need to register.

Number of purchasers: 0, views: 226

Readers community rating: votes 0

1. Ackerman P., Karatnycky A. (eds) (2005) How freedom is won: from civic resistance to durable democracy. Washington DC: Freedom House.

2. Butcher C., Svensson I. (2016) Manufacturing Dissent. Journal of Conflict Resolution. Vol. 60. No. 2: 311–339.

3. Chenoweth E., Shay C.W. (2020) NAVCO 1.3 Codebook. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Dataverse.

4. Chesnais J.-K. (1992) The Demographic Transition: Stages, Patterns, and Economic Implications. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

5. Choucri N. (1974) Population dynamics and international violence: Propositions, insights, and evidence. London: Lexington.

6. Cincotta R. (2015) Demography as early warning: Gauging future political transitions in the age-structural time domain. Journal of Intelligence Analysis. Vol. 22. No. 2: 129–148.

7. Cincotta R., Weber H. (2021) Youthful Age Structures and the Risks of Revolutionary and Separatist Conflicts. In: Goerres A., Vanhuysse P. (eds) Global Political Demography: Comparative Analyses of the Politics of Population Change in All World Regions. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan: 57–92.

8. Collier P., Hoeffler A. (2004) Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic Papers. Vol. 56. No. 4: 563–595.

9. Coppedge M., Gerring J., Knutsen C.H. et al. (2022) V-Dem [Country–Year/Country–Date] Dataset v 12. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

10. Dahlum S. (2019) Students in the Streets: Education and Nonviolent Protest. Comparative Political Studies. Vol. 52. No. 2: 277–309.

11. Dyson T. (2012) On Demographic and Democratic Transitions. Population and Development Review. Vol. 38. No. 1: 83–102.

12. Goldstone J.A. (1991) Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

13. Goldstone J.A. (2001) Toward a fourth generation of revolutionary theory. Filosofsko-literaturnyy zhurnal Logos [Philosophical and literary journal Logos]. Vol. 4. No. 1: 139–187. (In Russ.)

14. Goldstone J.A. (2002) Population and Security: How Demographic Change Can Lead to Violent Conflict. Journal of International Affairs. Vol. 56. No. 1: 3–21.

15. Goldstone J.A., Grinin L., Korotayev A. (2022) Waves of revolutions in the 21st century. Polis. Politicheskiye issledovaniya [Polis. Political Studies]. No. 4: 108–119. (In Russ.)

16. Huntington S.P. (2001) ‘So, are civilizations at war?’, Interview with Samuel P. Huntington by Michael Steinberger. The Observer. Sunday, October 21.

17. Johnstad P.G. (2010) Nonviolent democratization: a sensitivity analysis of how transition mode and violence impact the durability of democracy. Peace & Change. Vol. 35. No. 3: 464–482.

18. Kadivar M.A., Ketchley N. (2018) Sticks, Stones, and Molotov Cocktails: Unarmed Collective Violence and Democratization. Socius. Vol. 4: 1–16.

19. Kheng C. B. (2009) The communist insurgency in Malaysia, 1948–90: Contesting the nation-state and social change. New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies. Vol. 11. No. 1: 132–152.

20. Kim T., Sciubba J.D. (2015) The effect of age structure on the abrogation of military alliances. International Interactions. Vol. 41. No. 2: 279–308.

21. Korotayev A.V. et al. (2012) A trap at the escape from the trap. Mathematical modeling of socio-political destabilization in the countries of the world-system periphery and the events of the Arab spring of 2011. In: Akaev A. (ed.) Projects and risks of the future. Moscow: Krasand/URSS: 210–276. (In Russ.)

22. Korotayev A., Goldstone J. A., Zinkina J. (2015) Phases of global demographic transition correlate with phases of the Great Divergence and Great Convergence. Technological Forecasting and Social Change. Vol. 95: 163–169.

23. Korotayev A., Zinkina J. (2022) Egypt’s 2011 Revolution. A Demographic Structural Analysis. In: Goldstone J. A., Grinin L., Korotayev A. (eds.) Handbook of Revolutions in the 21st Century: The New Waves of Revolutions, and the Causes and Effects of Disruptive Political Change. Cham: Springer: 651–683.

24. Mesquida C.G., Wiener N.I. (1999) Male age composition and severity of conflicts. Politics and the life sciences. Vol. 18. No. 2: 181–189.

25. Mirkin B. (2013) Arab Spring: Demographics in a region in transition. New York: UNDP.

26. Moller H. (1968) Youth as a Force in the Modern World. Comparative Studies in Society and History. Vol. 10. No. 3: 237–260.

27. Nefedov S.A. (2015) “Youth Bulge” and the First Russian Revolution. Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniya [Sociological Studies]. Vol. 375. No. 7: 140–147. (In Russ.)

28. Staveteig S. (2005) The young and the restless: Population age structure and civil war. Environmental Change and Security Program Report. Vol. 11: 12–19.

29. UN Population Division Median Age of Population (2021с). World Population Prospects Database. URL: https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Files/ (accessed: 05.08.2021).

30. UN Population Division Population by Age Groups – Both Sexes. (2021b) World Population Prospects Database. URL: https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Files/ (accessed: 05.08.2021).

31. UN Population Division. World Population Prospects Database. (2021a) URL: https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/ (accessed 05.08.2021).

32. Urdal H. (2004) The devil in the demographics: the effect of youth bulges on domestic armed conflict, 1950–2000. Social Development Papers. Vol. 14.

33. Urdal H. (2006) A clash of generations? Youth bulges and political violence. International studies quarterly. Vol. 50. No. 3: 607–629.

34. Ustyuzhanin V., Grinin L., Medvedev I., Korotayev A. (2022). Education and Revolutions. Why do some revolutions take up arms while others do not? Politiya: Analiz. Khronika. Prognoz [Politeia-Journal of Political Theory, Political Philosophy and Sociology of Politics]. No. 104 (1): 50–71. (In Russ.)

35. Ustyuzhanin V.V., Korotayev A.V. (2022). Revolutions and democracy. Why do revolutions take armed or unarmed form? Vestnik Tomskogo gosuniversiteta. Filosofiya. Sotsiologiya. Politologiya [Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science]. No. 66: 198–210. (In Russ.)

36. Ustyuzhanin V., Korotayev A. (2023) Revolutions and Democracy. Can Democracies Prevent Revolutionary Armed Violence? Comparative Sociology. Vol. 22. No. 1: 95–137.

37. Vishnevskii A.G. (1976) Demographic revolution. Moscow: Statistika. (In Russ.)

38. Vishnevskii A.G. (2018) Demographic transition and the hypothesis of hyperbolic population growth. Demograficheskoe obozrenie [Demographic Review]. Vol. 5. No 1: 64–105. (In Russ.)

39. Weber H. (2013) Demography and democracy: the impact of youth cohort size on democratic stability in the world. Democratization. Vol. 20. No. 2: 335–357.

40. Weber H. (2019) Age structure and political violence: a re-assessment of the “youth bulge“ hypothesis. International Interactions. Vol. 45. No 1: 80–112.

41. Zubok Y.A., Chuprov V.I. (2008) Youth extremism. Essence and Specific of the Manifestations. Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya [Sociological Studies]. Vol. 289. No. 5: 37–46. (In Russ.)