“Politicized” Bureaucrats as a Subject of “Resource Type” Regions Economy Development

 
PIIS086904990011567-5-1
Publication type Article
Status Published
Authors
Occupation: Professor of Department
Affiliation: Kemerovo State University
Address: 6, Krasnaya St., Kemerovo, 650043, Russian Federation
Occupation: Associate Professor of Department
Affiliation: Kemerovo State University
Address: 6, Krasnaya St., Kemerovo, 650043, Russian Federation
Journal nameObshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost
EditionIssue 1
Pages128-139
Abstract

The paper discusses the problem associated with the assessment of the regional authority representatives’ ability to act as the subject of economic development of the “resource type” regions in the Russian Federation (Kemerovo region and Krasnoyarsk region are taken as an example). It is shown that “politicized” bureaucrats are the leading subject of the hybrid political-bureaucratic market that is the predominant type of “power market” in Russia. “Politicized” bureaucrats may choose ideologized, de-ideologized and corruption strategies. It is revealed that elements of ideologized and de-ideologized strategies are combined in the activity of “politicized” bureaucrats and they have the potential to act as a subject of development.

Keywordsideologized, de-ideologized and corrupted politicians; “politicized” and “rational” bureaucrats; “resource type” region; discrete structural alternatives; “enclave dual economy”, “integrated regional economy”
Received15.09.2020
Publication date17.02.2017
Number of characters748
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