On the Corporate Financial Policy under Shocks and Restrictions

 
PIIS020736760027018-8-1
DOI10.31857/S020736760027018-8
Publication type Article
Status Published
Authors
Occupation: analyst
Affiliation: Institute for Economic Strategies of the Social Sciences Division of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Address: Russian Federation, Moscow
Journal nameObshchestvo i ekonomika
EditionIssue 8
Pages84-94
Abstract

Organizational capital is a metric for the quality of corporate governance. The author scrutinizes the influence of the organizational capital, shocks and flexibility on the company's financing policy. External shocks (like increased funding costs, external sanctions) force Russian public companies to switch to internal sources of funding, acting in accordance with the “prevention motive” hypothesis of John Maynard Keynes: under conditions of financial constraints, an economic entity uses dividends as an investment resource. Financial flexibility allows responding to external shocks by adjusting the capital structure to allocate cash flows for subsequent financing of investment projects.

Keywordsfinancial policy, shock, financial constraints, financial flexibility, organization-al capital, capital structure, warning motive
Received28.09.2023
Publication date29.09.2023
Number of characters22151
Cite  
100 rub.
When subscribing to an article or issue, the user can download PDF, evaluate the publication or contact the author. Need to register.

Number of purchasers: 0, views: 86

Readers community rating: votes 0

1. Lopatnikov S. Strana i neft': Ot «syr'evogo pridatka» k «lideru mirovoj ehnergetiki». Vedomosti. 2006. 30 yanvarya. URL: https://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/articles/2006/01/30/strana-i-neft-ot-syrevogo-pridatka-k-lideru-mirovoj-jenergetiki.

2. Attig N., Cleary S. (2014). Organizational Capital and Investment‐Cash Flow Sensitivity: The Effect of Management Quality Practices // Financial Management, 43(3), vol. 75, pp. 473–504.

3. Eisfeldt A., Papanikolaou D. (2013). Organization Capital and the Cross-Section of Expected Returns // Journal of Finance, vol. 68, pp. 1365–1406.

4. Fischer E., Heinkel R., Zechner J. (1989). Dynamic capital structure choice: Theory and tests // Journal of Finance, vol. 44, pp. 19–40.

5. Frank M., Goyal V. (2007). Trade-off and pecking order theories of debt // Working Paper. University of Minnesota, pp. 1–82.

6. Ge L., Jamil T., Yu J. (2022). Organization Capital and Debt Structure // Working paper. Monash University, pp. 1–48.

7. Harris M., Raviv A. (1991). The Theory of Capital Structure // Journal of Finance, vol. 44, pp. 297–355.

8. Hasan M., Lobo G., Qiu B. (2021). Organizational Capital, Corporate Tax Avoidance, and Firm Value // Journal of Corporate Finance, vol. 70, pp. 1–27.

9. Keynes J. The general theory of employment, interest and money // London: MacMillan. 1936.

10. Korajczyk R., Levy A. (2003). Capital structure choice: Macroeconomic conditions and finan-cial constraints // Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 68, pp. 75–109.

11. Lev B., Radhakrishnan S. (2005). The Valuation of Organization Capital. NBER Chapters in Corrado C., Haltiwanger J., Sichel D. (Eds.), Measuring Capital in the New Economy (pp. 73–110): National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

12. Liu T., Shivdasani A. (2022). Do Credit Ratings Affect Financial Policy? Evidence from S&P’s 2013 Methodology Revision // Working paper. University of Utah. University of North Carolina, pp. 1–67.

Система Orphus

Loading...
Up