The balance of economic interests of shareholders and management in corporate governance

Occupation: analyst
Affiliation: Institute for Economic Strategies of the Social Sciences Division of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Address: Russian Federation, Moscow

Journal name

Obshchestvo i ekonomika

Edition

Issue 5

Pages

38-49

Abstract

The author considers shareholders’ activism as a correction mechanism for management policy. Shareholders’ activism allows them to control the decisions made by the governing body and to prevent the domination of CEOs’ private interests. The criterion for assessing management efficiency is the achievement of the corporate benefit in the long term. Fiduciary duties of management limit the latter’s appetite for the advancement of their personal interests. The author advocates for the convergence of the financial interests of the participant (shareholder) and management in the long term using a long-term motivation tool.

Keywords

corporate governance, shareholders’ activism, long-term motivation, fiduciary duties, the corporate benefit, the corrective mechanis

Received

20.05.2021

Publication date

24.05.2021

Number of characters

28079

Cite

GOST	Lutsenko S. The balance of economic interests of shareholders and management in corporate governance // Obshchestvo i ekonomika – 2021. – Issue 5 C. 38-49 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://oie.jes.su/S020736760014936-8-1 (circulation date: 26.04.2024). DOI: 10.31857/S020736760014936-8
MLA	Lutsenko, Sergey "The balance of economic interests of shareholders and management in corporate governance." Obshchestvo i ekonomika 5 (2021):38-49. DOI: 10.31857/S020736760014936-8
APA	Lutsenko S. (2021). The balance of economic interests of shareholders and management in corporate governance. Obshchestvo i ekonomika (5), pp.38-49 DOI: 10.31857/S020736760014936-8

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