Critical Materials’ Supply Chains and US National Security

 
PIIS013122270025467-4-1
DOI10.20542/0131-2227-67-2023-2-5-16
Publication type Article
Status Published
Authors
Occupation: Head of Center
Affiliation: Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO)
Address: 23, Profsoyuznaya Str., Moscow, 117997, Russian Federation
Occupation: Senior Researcher
Affiliation: Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences
Address: 23, Profsoyuznaya Str., Moscow, 117997, Russian Federation
Occupation: Researcher
Affiliation: Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences
Address: 23, Profsoyuznaya Str., Moscow, 117997, Russian Federation
Journal nameMirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia
EditionVolume 67 Issue 2
Pages5-16
Abstract

The COVID-19 crisis and the Special Military Operation in Ukraine have showed how quickly and deeply global supply chains can be disrupted. This is especially true for critical and strategic materials. Many of these raw materials are critical to the European and US economies. They form a strong industrial base, participating in the production of a wide range of goods used in everyday life and modern technologies. Reliable and unfettered access to certain raw materials is a growing concern in the United States and around the world. Success in transforming and modernizing economies depends on the sustainable supply of primary and secondary raw materials needed to scale up clean and digital technologies in all industrial ecosystems. One of the lessons of the COVID-19 crisis is the need to reduce dependency and strengthen the diversity and security of supply of critical raw materials. The expansion of strategic self-sufficiency is a priority of the long-term policy of the US and the EU. This article highlights the challenges and priorities for the United States to strengthen its strategic approach to building more sustainable commodity value chains. Strategic self-sufficiency, therefore, should, in the opinion of American and European experts, be based on diversified access to world commodity markets. At the same time, in order to reduce external dependence, the problem of rapidly growing global demand for resources is proposed to be solved by reducing and reusing materials. Achieving resource security requires action to diversify supply from primary and secondary sources, reduce dependency, and improve resource efficiency. This applies to all types of raw materials, including base metals, industrial minerals, and biotic materials.

Keywordscritical material, supply chains, risk of disruption, US national security
Received03.05.2023
Publication date03.05.2023
Number of characters27906
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1 США все чаще сетуют на чрезмерную зависимость от внешних поставок многих видов продукции, особенно стратегически важных материалов [ист. 1]. Произошедший в последние десятилетия рывок глобализации сопровождался бумом офшорного производства. В результате США в значительной мере “демобилизовали” свою производственную базу. Дефициты, связанные с пандемией COVID-19 в 2020–2021 гг., высветили недостатки такой системы, а введенные в 2022 г. беспрецедентные санкции против России и усилившиеся трения с КНР заставили американские власти всерьез задуматься об опасности экономической привязки к ограниченному числу зарубежных государств.
2 ПРОБЛЕМЫ УСТОЙЧИВОСТИ ГЛОБАЛЬНЫХ ЦЕПОЧЕК ПОСТАВОК И СТОИМОСТНЫХ ЦЕПОЧЕК
3 Пандемия COVID-19 выявила давние уязвимые места в американских цепочках поставок. Переход на работу и обучение из дома создали глобальную нехватку полупроводниковых микросхем, затронувшую автомобильную, промышленные и телекоммуникационные отрасли. Экстремальные погодные явления, усугубляемые климатическими изменениями, еще больше обострили дефициты.
4 Как республиканская, так и демократическая администрации выражали обеспокоенность по поводу зависимости американской оборонной промышленности от ограниченного числа внутренних поставщиков [ист. 2]. Необходимые ей инновации часто требуют экосистем, навыков и производственных мощностей, которых нет в США.
5 Экономическая безопасность – стабильная занятость и бесперебойная работа важнейших отраслей – также требует устойчивых цепочек поставок. Уже более 10 лет назад Министерство обороны обнаружило, что основным отраслям гражданской промышленности может быть нанесен большой ущерб от разрушения стратегических поставок критических материалов. Отмечалось, что сегодня Китай перерабатывает 60% лития и 80% кобальта в мире, а это основное сырье для аккумуляторов большой емкости, которые критически важны для автомобильной промышленности США [ист. 2].
6 Наконец, внутренний инновационный потенциал страны зависит от надежной и диверсифицированной промышленной базы. Когда производство перемещается в офшор, за ним, как правило, следуют инновации. Министерство торговли США отмечает, что крупномасштабные государственные инвестиции в производство полупроводников позволили корейским и тайваньским фирмам опередить американские фирмы в этой сфере [ист. 3].
7 Устойчивость цепочки поставок определяется ее способностью быстро восстанавливаться после каких-то шоков. Традиционный подход частного сектора и государственной политики к внутреннему производству, когда в течение многих лет приоритет отдавался эффективности и низким затратам, а не безопасности и устойчивости, привел к увеличению рисков в цепочках поставок важнейшей продукции, а также, по мнению американских экспертов, подорвал уровень жизни рабочих и способность управлять природными ресурсами внутри страны и на глобальном уровне.

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