Regulatory Autonomy of Great Britain: Problems and Perspectives

 
PIIS013122270016888-7-1
DOI10.20542/0131-2227-2021-65-7-71-79
Publication type Article
Status Published
Authors
Affiliation:
Address: Russian Federation
Journal nameMirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia
EditionVolume 65 Issue 7
Pages71-79
Abstract

Sovereignty does not imply regulatory autonomy. After Brexit, the UK should align its regulatory policy with European norms, if it is interested in close partnership with the EU. Compromises must be made by both sides in order to ensure stability of the partnership. The EU will have to acknowledge the UK’s right to diverge from European rules. Britain will have to partly accept the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. The structure of dispute settlement mechanism which will be created under the partnership agreement should be a product of a compromise. The present study shows that optimal structure of dispute settlement mechanism must include two different procedures: one for political issues and the other for commercial issues. The central role for the European Court of Justice must be envisaged as a part of politically oriented procedure. There must be no role for the European Court of Justice or any other EU institutions under the commercially oriented procedure. The former procedure reflects desire of the European Union to set the pace of political communication. The latter reflects the interest of Great Britain to simplify economic relations, which means that, firstly, disputes are resolved by independent arbiters; secondly, the EU acknowledges the UK’s right to diverge from European regulations; and thirdly, the UK accepts the EU’s right to impose countervailing duties to compensate for adverse effects of divergence on competition. This article also examines the main problems of future British regulatory policy, especially in the field of state aid. Boris Johnson’s government has decided not to form a full-fledged regulatory regime in the area of state aid. Its stance is politically appropriate since Conservative party manifesto for the 2019 general election promised to support local industries without limitations. But that decision created a great deal of economic risk. Firstly, the absence of a domestic subsidy control regulator can cause chaos within regulation system because workable norms and rules can only be sustained by a tight enforcement mechanism. Secondly, the EU can cite lack of subsidy control as an obstacle for British business to have unrestricted access to the European market.

KeywordsGreat Britain, European Union, government regulation, autonomy, sovereignty, subsidies
Publication date23.09.2021
Number of characters24213
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1 В центре внимания исследователей регуляторной политики находятся проблемы согласования норм поведения внутри сложных систем транснациональных коммуникаций. Так, британский ученый Дж. Блэк [1] провела анализ трудностей, которые возникают при интерпретации регуляторных норм, выработанных международными организациями. Споры между их участниками, порождая конфликтующие трактовки одних и тех же норм, с одной стороны, создают препятствия для взаимопонимания, а с другой – стимулируют плодотворную эволюцию иерархий управления организациями. Дж. Блэк констатирует, что полномочия устанавливать нормы зависят не от правовой, а от функциональной легитимности иерархий, от их способности эффективно решать организационные задачи. Т. Бюте и У. Маттли [2] полагают, что условием устойчивости норм, на которые ориентируются при принятии решений субъекты рынка, является совместимость национального режима регулирования и режимов, вырабатываемых глобальными институтами. Причем национальные и глобальные регуляторы дополняют друг друга: чем более четко регламентирована работа национального регулятора, тем успешнее он адаптирует глобальные нормы к институциональной специфике конкретного государства.
2 Положение, в котором оказалась Британия после выхода из Европейского союза, делает некоторые исследования особенно актуальными. Э. Голберг [3] указывает, что сотрудничество с ЕС по вопросам регулирования, как правило, требует от его партнеров признания главенства европейских стандартов. Это связано с тем, что регуляторная политика Союза изначально сложилась как один из инструментов конвергенции, а затем интеграции суверенных юрисдикций. К. Армстронг [4], исследуя правовой аспект размежевания с Евросоюзом, скептически оценивает шансы Лондона добиться регуляторной автономии от Брюсселя.
3 В российской научной литературе последствия обретения Британией суверенитета рассмотрены с разных точек зрения. Экономические последствия проанализированы в статьях А.В. Кузнецова [5] и Е.С. Хесина [6], институциональные вопросы рассматривают Л.О. Бабынина [7] и Н.Ю. Кавешников [8]. Политический аспект этого процесса изучен в работах Е.В. Ананьевой [9], К.А. Годованюк [10], О.В. Охошина [11]. Дипломатический потенциал Британии исследован Е.М. Харитоновой [12]. Регуляторной политике ЕС посвящена монография Н.Б. Кондратьевой [13].
4 В настоящей статье акцент делается на анализе устройства механизма разрешения споров Евросоюза и Великобритании как внешнеэкономических партнеров, каждый из которых претендует на полную регуляторную автономию.
5

РЕГУЛЯТОРНАЯ АВТОНОМИЯ: РАСХОЖДЕНИЕ ТРАКТОВОК

6 Рынок Евросоюза является сферой действия общих для всех участвующих в нем государств норм регулирования. Единство правил и стандартов гарантирует однородность конкурентной среды. С точки зрения Британии выход из ЕС должен означать обретение регуляторной автономии, свободы устанавливать собственные нормы во всех областях социально-экономической политики.

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