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Second Century of the Communist Party of China and New Bipolarity
 
PIIS013122270016824-7-1
DOI10.20542/0131-2227-2021-65-7-25-33
Publication type Article
Status Published
Authors
Vasily V. Mikheev 
Occupation: Head of Research, Center for Asia Pacific Studies
Affiliation: Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO)
Address: 23, Profsoyuznaya Str., Moscow, 117997, Russian Federation
Sergei A. Lukonin
Affiliation: Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO)
Address: Russian Federation, Moscow
Journal nameMirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia
EditionVolume 65 Issue 7
Pages25-33
Abstract

Linking the 100th anniversary of the CPC, celebrated in 2021, with long-term goals, the Chinese leadership is talking about the country’s entry into the next stage of development – the stage of the “second century of the CPC.” The 14th plan for the socio-economic development of the country for 2021–2025, adopted in March 2021 and long-range objectives through 2035 are seen as the first steps in a new round of China’s evolution. According to the Chinese leadership, the goals of the first century have been largely achieved. Now China faces more ambitious tasks: 1) achieve socialist modernization by 2035, doubling its GDP per capita to the level of an average developed country; 2) to reach the German or Japanese level of industrial and innovative development by 2050; 3) to ensure the innovative and scientific and technological self-sufficiency of China in order to get away from the current technological dependence on the United States and the West in general, which, in the opinion of the Chinese leadership, poses a threat to the national security of the PRC; 4) to create by 2027 (100th anniversary of the PLA) a strong modern army; 5) Ensure China’s global leadership by the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC in 2049. The peculiarities of the new 14th five-year plan include the absence of targets for GDP growth rates for 2021–2025. The benchmark will now be set every year. For example, for 2021, this indicator is set in the highly redundant formulation “6 percent or more”. Beijing records the nearing transition from quantitative planning to qualitative planning. The aggravation of relations between China and the United States under the Biden administration and Beijing’s retaliatory, in a new way, actions in almost all areas, from ideology to security and defense, in the near future will change the global balance of power and lead to the formation of a “new bipolarity” implying in the context of globalization, that in addition to the two new planetary “poles” in the world, regional and subregional centers of power will persist and develop, forming, as saying in China, modern “polycentricity”. Against such a background, the “new bipolarity” will be characterized not only by a direct clash of Chinese and American interests, but also by a struggle for dominance, influence, and alliance with the leaders of the “polycentric world.” Within the framework of the “new bipolarity”, the United States is strengthening relations with allies, opposing the “democratic economy” of the West to the “authoritarianism of China”. The concept of financing by the West of the world transport infrastructure of a “democratic sense” as opposed to the “authoritarian” Chinese “Belt and Road” is put forward. In the reciprocal steps of China to attract partners to the “Chinese pole”, the main place is given to Russia, relations with which are characterized as “exemplary” for the whole world. At the same time, there is an opinion among Chinese experts that “excessive rapprochement” with Russia is unprofitable for China, since for Russia, as well as for the United States, China is not only a partner, but also a “strategic competitor.” China has become the main Russian trade and economic partner, in many directions it has turned into an uncontested supplier. At the same time, the “Sino-Russian Comprehensive Partnership in a New Era” contains many tactical and long-term problems.

Keywordsworld economy, international relations, China, foreign policy, new stage of development, centenary of the Chinese communist party, Russian-Chinese relations
Received17.09.2021
Publication date23.09.2021
Number of characters27109
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Table of contents

“НОВОЕ СТОЛЕТИЕ” КПК
НОВАЯ БИПОЛЯРНОСТЬ
КИТАЙСКИЕ ОТВЕТЫ
РОССИЙСКО-КИТАЙСКОЕ СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКОЕ ПАРТНЕРСТВО В НОВУЮ ЭПОХУ
1 Согласно планам руководства КНР, 2021 г. должен стать важной вехой в современной истории Китая, знаменующей начало перехода страны к следующей стадии социально-экономического развития и глобального позиционирования. Предпосылки к этому переходу активно формировались в последнее время и связаны с тремя главными событиями первой четверти 2021 г.:
2
  • принятием на мартовской Сессии ВСНП 14-го плана социально-экономического развития КНР на 2021–2025 гг., обозначенного китайским руководством в качестве “первого этапа” реализации “Долгосрочных целей КНР до 2035 г.” [1];
3
  • 100-летним юбилеем создания КПК и наступлением “второго столетия” развития страны под руководством компартии, что потребовало от руководства КНР увязки новых среднесрочных и долгосрочных задач с отмечаемым в 2021 г. знаменательным событием;
4
  • приходом к власти в США администрации Дж. Байдена, который в первые же дни президентства структурировал стратегические противоречия с Китаем.
5 Увязывая огромные достижения Китая в различных сферах с политической властью КПК, пекинские лидеры объявили о решении задач первого столетия Компартии, ассоциируемых с именами Мао Цзэдуна (образование Китайской Народной Республики) и Дэн Сяопина (проведение рыночных реформ и политики “открытости”). Решение этих задач к концу “первого столетия” позволило Китаю, если судить по итогам последней, 13-й пятилетки, полностью преодолеть крайнюю бедность (жизнь на менее чем 2 долл. в день), построить “общество средней зажиточности” (по результатам 2020 г., с размером ВВП на душу населения на уровне 10 тыс. долл.) и занять значимое место в мире [2].
6

“НОВОЕ СТОЛЕТИЕ” КПК
7 Задачи “нового столетия КПК” выглядят еще более масштабными. Предполагается:
8
  • вывести страну к 2035 г. на уровень “современного социалистического государства”, удвоив ВВП на душу населения до уровня среднеразвитой европейской страны;
9
  • выйти к 2050 г. на германский или японский уровень промышленного и инновационного развития;
10
  • обеспечить инновационную и научно-техническую самообеспеченность Китая – с тем, чтобы уйти от нынешней технологической зависимости от США и Запада, которая, по мнению китайского руководства, представляет угрозу национальной безопасности КНР;
11
  • создать к 2027 г. (100-летие Народно-освободительной армии Китая) сильную современную армию;
12
  • обеспечить глобальное лидерство Китая к 100-летию образования КНР в 2049 г. [3].
13 В условиях экономической неопределенности, связанной с неясностью перспектив восстановления мировой экономики в пандемический и пост-пандемический период, Китай не стал ставить конкретных количественных целей по темпам прироста ВВП и другим показателям на период 14-й пятилетки и до 2035 г.
14 На мартовской сессии ВСНП экономические ориентиры на 2021 г. заданы с высокой степенью резервированности – прирост ВВП на уровне 6% и выше. Во исполнение среднесрочных и долгосрочных научных и военных задач в 2021 г. предполагается существенно увеличить расходы на развитие фундаментальной науки – на 10.6% (расходы на прикладные исследования при этом увеличиваются на 7%) и обороны – на 6.8% (против прироста на 6.6% в 2020 г.) до уровня в 209 млрд долл. [1].

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