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Tax Majority Optimization of Citizens’s Incomes and Properties
 
PIIS042473880005773-9-1
DOI10.31857/S042473880005773-9
Publication type Article
Status Published
Authors
Sergei Graborov 
Occupation: Leading Researcher
Affiliation: Central Economics and Mathematics Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences
Address: Moscow, Russian Federation
Journal nameEkonomika i matematicheskie metody
EditionVolume 55 Issue 4
Pages28-42
Abstract

The article provides one of possible approaches to the non-linear multidimensional optimization of citizens’ taxation under majority rule in case of a number of incomes’ and properties’ types. The optimality criterion of an initial model is set in a vector form. All the citizens-taxpayers minimize their individual tax payments. The income (revenue) and property taxes are paid under the non-linear scale, and the expenditure (consumption) tax is paid under the linear scale, whereas the tax rates and the thresholds of tax bases are the optimized values. Besides the tax functions and the individual criteria of the citizens, the ratios of the original model include the aggregate amount limitations of their tax payments, as well as of the admitted values of the tax rates. The necessity of including into the model additional conditions for forming coalitions is established. These conditions ensure making a common decision on the optimal tax rates by and for all the participants of the majority groupы in case of any number of incomes’ and properties’ types. The conditions, under which the criteria of all the participants of such coalitions become identical, are found. These criteria guarantee making a common decision on the tax rates. The calculation routine of the tax rates on the incomes and properties of the citizens is provided.

Keywordsbudget and tax decisions, multi-criteria optimization, majority rule, direct and indirect taxes.
Received13.08.2019
Publication date16.12.2019
Number of characters33743
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