Moral Responsibility, Moral Sanctions, and the Value and Normative Content of Morality

The paper deals with the problem of the role of moral of sanctions — an expression of retrospective moral responsibility — in the moral experience. Moral sanctions are negative consequences of a moral transgression or deviation that spring from their condemnation. This kind of sanctions includes public censure and self-censure. The author tries to establish whether the all content of morality is supported by moral sanctions. The first object of the analysis are moral norms (rules, requirements) creating obligations. There is an interesting precedent of splitting apart obligations and sanctions in H. Hart’s philosophy. Though Hart overlooks “the conceptual intuition that something can be genuinely obligatory only if those who are obligated can justiﬁably be held responsible or accountable for compliance” (S. Darwall). This intuition is deeply rooted in the moral consciousness and ethical thought (the most vivid examples — S. Pufendorf and J.S. Mill). But moral norms (rules, requirements) creating obligations are not the only element of the content of morality. Moral values have a capacity to influence the behavior of an agent not through norms (rules, requirements) but directly. R. Nozick supposed that there is a special type of sanction in this sphere (the so called “value sanction”). The author shows that it is not a sanction proper. The main conclusion of the paper is as follows: the moral space without sanctions and retrospective responsibility is the space there moral values influence the behavior of an agent not only directly but without overlapping with moral norms (rules, requirements). Supererogation fits the bill perfectly.

Keywords

ethics, morality, moral values, moral norms, moral obligations, moral responsibility, moral sanctions, supererogation

Received

28.06.2023

Publication date

28.06.2023

Number of characters

37557

Cite

GOST	Prokofyev A. Moral Responsibility, Moral Sanctions, and the Value and Normative Content of Morality // Chelovek – 2023. – V. 34. – Issue 3 C. 165-182 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://chelovek-journal.ru/S023620070026104-1-1 (circulation date: 02.05.2024). DOI: 10.31857/S023620070026104-1
MLA	Prokofyev, Andrey V "Moral Responsibility, Moral Sanctions, and the Value and Normative Content of Morality." Chelovek 34.3 (2023):165-182. DOI: 10.31857/S023620070026104-1
APA	Prokofyev A. (2023). Moral Responsibility, Moral Sanctions, and the Value and Normative Content of Morality. Chelovek 34(3), pp.165-182 DOI: 10.31857/S023620070026104-1

100 rub.

When subscribing to an article or issue, the user can download PDF, evaluate the publication or contact the author. Need to register.

Number of purchasers: 0, views: 327

Readers community rating: votes 0

1. Kelsen H. Chistoe uchenie o prave [Pure Theory of Law]. St. Petersburg: Alef-Press Publ., 2015.

2. Mill J.S. Utilitarizm [Utilitarianism]. Rostov-na-Donu: Donskoi izdatel’skii dom Publ., 2013.

3. Prokofyev A.V. Moral’naya universal’nost’ i fenomen sverkhobyazatel’nykh deistvii [Moral Universality and the Phenomenon of Supererogatory Acts]. Chelovek. 2022а. Vol. 33, N 4. P. 148–164.

4. Prokofyev A.V. Moral’nye sanktsii: dve traditsii ponimaniya [Moral Sanctions: Two Traditions of Understanding] // Vestnik RUDN. Ser.: Filosofiya. 2022b. Vol. 26, N 2. P. 454–469.

5. Hart H.L.A. Ponyatie prava [The Concept of Law]. St. Petersburg: St. Petersburg University Press, 2007.

6. Austin J. The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

7. Darwall S. Honor, History, and Relationship: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics II. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

8. Hart H.L.A. The Concept of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.

9. Hieronymi P. Fairness, Sanction, and Condemnation. Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Vol. 8. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. P. 229–258.

10. Mill J.S. Utilitarianism. The Collected Works. Vol. 10. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969. P. 203–259.

11. Nozick R. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1983.

12. Pufendorf S. On the Law of Nature and Nations. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934.

13. Scanlon T. Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2008.