All
 
|
 
 


Failure of EU conditionality in Turkey: positive conditionality, negative result
 
PIIS032150750009876-5-1
DOI10.31857/S032150750009876-5
Publication type Article
Status Published
Authors
Tatiana S. Rudneva 
Occupation: Post-graduate student, National Research University Higher School of Economics
Affiliation: Post-graduate student, National Research University Higher School of Economics
Address: Russian Federation, Moscow
Journal nameAsia and Africa Today
EditionIssue 6
Pages37-42
Abstract

In order to join the European Union, candidate countries have to meet a specific set of conditions (the Copenhagen criteria), which include maintaining stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. Incentivising the countries wanting to join the EU to strengthen democratic institutions, EU membership conditionality - tying the possibility of membership to compliance with membership conditions - is considered to be an effective tool for  promoting  democracy  and  the  rule  of  law.  However,  the  effectiveness  of  conditionality  was  recently  questioned  by  an authoritarian turn in Turkey and democratic backsliding in other candidate countries.

The  question  that  arises  from  recent  developments  is  whether  EU  membership  conditionality,  based  on  rewards  rather  than sanctions (“positive” conditionality), is equipped to deal with democratic backsliding in candidate countries. This article closely examines the EU’s choice of responses addressing the problem of democratic deterioration in Turkey, the country with the most drastic dismantling of democratic institutions amongst the candidate countries, and assesses the scope and limits of the tools the EU employed to redress severe democratic backsliding.

The article concludes that positive conditionality by itself is limitedly equipped to effectively counteract the consolidation of authoritarianism. For Turkey, the situation was also aggravated by the lack of expertise on the part of the EU, which previously had no experience in dealing with democratic backsliding in candidate countries. Additionally, there were instances of conditionality being applied inconsistently, compromising its credibility. What also affected the application of conditionality is the leverage Turkey gained in EU-Turkey relations due to the EU’s need to enlist the country’s support in curbing the flow of Syrian refugees to Europe. Combined, the problems resulted in the ineffectiveness of measures taken to counteract democratic deterioration in Turkey.

KeywordsEU conditionality, EU enlargement, democratic backsliding, Turkey
Publication date27.06.2020
Number of characters24415
Cite  
100 rub.
When subscribing to an article or issue, the user can download PDF, evaluate the publication or contact the author. Need to register.

Number of purchasers: 0, views: 825

Readers community rating: votes 0 

1. Vachudova M.A. EU Leverage and National Interests in the Balkans: The Puzzles of Enlargement Ten Years On. Journal of Common Market Studies. 2014. V. 52. № 1, pp. 122-138.
2. Muftuler-Bac M. Backsliding in judicial reforms: domestic political costs as limits to EU’s political conditionality in Turkey. Journal of Contemporary European Studies. 2019. V. 27. № 1, pp. 61-76.
3. Kmezic M. and Bieber F. The Crisis of Democracy in the Western Balkans: An Anatomy of Stabilitocracy and the Limits of EU Democracy Promotion. Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group Policy Paper. 2017.
4. Börzel T.A. Building Member States: How the EU Promotes Political Change in its New Members, Accession Candidates, and Eastern Neighbors. Geopolitics, History, and International Relations. 2016. V. 8. № 1, pp. 76-112.
5. Schimmelfennig F., Engert S. and Knobel H. Costs, Commitment and Compliance: The Impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey. Journal of Common Market Studies. 2003. V. 41. № 3, pp. 495-518.
6. Gateva E. European Union Enlargement Conditionality. London, 2015.
7. Muftuler-Bac M. The Pandora's Box: democratisation and rule of law in Turkey. Asia-Europe Journal. 2016. V. 14, № 1, pp. 61-77.
8. European Commission. Turkey 2007 Progress Report. Brussels, 2007.
9. Saatçioğlu B. De-Europeanisation in Turkey: The Case of the Rule of Law. South European Society and Politics. 2016. V. 21, № 1, pp. 133-146.
10. European Commission. Turkey 2010 Progress Report. Brussels, 2010.
11. European Commission. Turkey 2013 Progress Report. Brussels, 2013.
12. Reuters. 21.01.2014.
13. Time. 06.02.2014.
14. European Commission. Turkey 2014 Progress Report, Brussels, 2014.
15. Vachudova M.A. EU enlargement and state capture in the Western Balkans. Dzankic, J., Keil, S. and Kmezic, M. (eds.). The Europeanisation Of The Western Balkans - A Failure of EU Conditionality? London, 2019, pp. 63-85.
16. Reuters. 8.02.2016.
17. European Commission. Turkey 2015 Progress Report. Brussels, 2015.
18. European Parliament. European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2016 on EU-Turkey relations, 2016/2993(RSP). Strasbourg, 2016.
19. Deutsche Welle. 25.07.2016.
20. European Parliament. European Parliament resolution of 6 July 2017 on the 2016 Commission Report on Turkey (2016/2308(INI)). Strasbourg, 2017.
21. European Parliament. European Parliament resolution of 13 March 2019 on the 2018 Commission Report on Turkey (2018/2150(INI). Strasbourg, 2019.
22. European Commission. Annex to the Commission Implementing Decision, C(2018) 5067 final. Brussels, 2018.
23. Schimmelfennig F. and Sedelmeier U. Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of European Public Policy. 2004. V. 11. № 4, pp. 661-679.

Система Orphus

Loading...
Up