Abstract | The article provides an analysis of the EU policy toward the three countries of the South Caucasus – Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Washington’s position on the Eastern Partnership policy. It deals with a spectrum of the EU’s interests in the region as a whole and in particular in each country having strategic interest for Brussels. Also the EU and the U.S. approach to the problem of resolving the “frozen” conflicts in the region together with their similarities and differences. The author believes that currently Brussels’ key principle in implementing its policies aimed at gradual integration of the South Caucasian countries in the EU based on democracy comes first, has been replaced with another one that is more justified, and therefore more efficient which comes mainly from economic considerations. It seems that the EU seeks to expand and strengthen its special relations with every single country of the region, despite the fact that, unlike Georgia which made an unambiguous choice towar.ds the West, Armenia tries to balance between Russia and the West, while Azerbaijan on the eve of signing its new agreement with the EU, focuses on the enhancing economic / energy cooperation with it. That is why the EU enlargement policy toward the post-Soviet space as a whole will retain all its main constants: there is a number of joint projects and other European initiatives on the waiting list ready to take their start. However the objectives of the Eastern Partnership policy and the ways and means of its implementation will be constantly adjusted and adapted taking into account the specifics of the domestic political development of every single country in the region to make the European choice as attractive as possible for them. As a rule, the EU doesn’t attach much importance to such significant issue as the settlement of conflicts in the post-Soviet space. Despite the whole range of approaches put forward by Brussels dealing with conflict settlement the EU seems incapable of suggesting its own program aimed at resolving this problem as such kind of initiatives does not lead to a political settlement of conflicts, but only create some opportunities for doing this. As for the U.S. policy towards the frozen conflicts in the region it seems that in Georgia for instance currently neither Washington nor NATO are not ready enough to provide its military guarantees to Georgia as well as to solve the problem of its territorial integrity. Concerning the problem of Nagorny Karabakh conflict settlement Washington, which along with the Russian Federation and France is the co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group dealing with resolving this conflict, intends to push the button to resolve this problem on its own. In this situation Russian mediation mission aimed at resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict may become much more efficient. Indeed, at present neither the EU nor NATO could provide Armenia with such kind of security guarantees as Russia could do it both on its Turkish border and in the Nagor-no-Karabakh conflict. Also it is important to underline that the ability of Moscow to maintain a balance of power despite the unprecedented confrontation between Russia and the West finds support from the West which confirms its special role in the peace process. |