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Subject, Self-Consciousness, and Self-Knowledge in Kant’s Transcendental Philosophy
 
Title (other)Субъект, самосознание и самопознание в трансцендентальной философии Канта
PIIS271326680023706-6-1
DOI10.18254/S271326680023706-6
Publication type Article
Status Published
Authors
Luca Forgione 
Affiliation: University of Basilicata
Address: Italy
Journal nameStudies in Transcendental Philosophy
EditionVolume 3 Issue 3
Abstract

Kant points to two forms of self-consciousness: the inner sense, or empirical apperception, based on a sensory form of self-awareness, and transcendental apperception. Through the notion of inner sense, Kant also allows for an introspective account of self-awareness; nonetheless, Kant holds an utterly sophisticated notion of basic self-consciousness provided for by the notion of transcendental apperception. As we will see, the doctrine of apperception is not to be confused with an introspective psychological approach: in reality, it is a formal model for the thinking activity itself which explains the most central concepts regarding subjecthood.

Abstract (other)

Кант указывает на две формы самосознания: внутреннее чувство или эмпирическая апперцепция, основанная на сенсорной форме самосознания, и трансцендентальная апперцепция. Благодаря понятию внутреннего чувства Кант допускает интроспективное изучение самосознания. Но в действительности он придерживается чрезвычайно сложного понятия базового самосознания, данного в понятии трансцендентальной апперцепции. Как мы увидим, доктрину апперцепции не следует путать с интроспективным психологическим подходом, поскольку трансцендентальная апперцепция – формальная модель самой мыслительной деятельности, которая объясняет самые центральные понятия, касающиеся субъектности.

KeywordsKant, self-consciousness, self-knowledge, transcendental apperception, empirical apperception
Keywords list (other)Кант, самосознание, самопознание, трансцендентальная апперцепция, эмпирическая апперцепция
Received30.11.2022
Publication date29.12.2022
Number of characters40871
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1 There is probably no formulation on the nature of subjectivity and how the self-conscious subject represents itself through the word ‘I’ that is more effective and closer to the questions posed in contemporary debate than the famous first paragraph of Kant’s Anthropology: “The fact that the human being can have the “I” in his representations raises him infinitely above all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person, and by virtue of the unity of consciousness through all changes that happen to him, one and the same person - i.e., through rank and dignity an entirely different being from things, such as irrational animals, with which one can do as one likes. This holds even when he cannot yet say “I,” because he still has it in thoughts, just as all languages must think it when they speak in the first person, even if they do not have a special word to express this concept of “I.” For this faculty (namely to think) is understanding” (Anth 7: 127, 15)1. 1. I have developed some aspects of these topics in Forgione (2018). Kantian English quotations are from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. P. Guyer and A. Wood (Cambridge University Press, 1992ff.). As is customary, references to Kant include the volume and page numbers in the Akademie edition of Kant’s works, followed by the corresponding page numbers of the English translation (if available): Kants gesammelte Schriften, hrsg von der Deutschen (formerly Koniglichen Preussischen) Akademie der Wissenschaften, 29 vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902ff.). The Critique of Pure Reason is cited by the usual A/B method.
2 In this passage Kant points out the linguistic achievements that make possible for a subject to think about itself in a special way—to think about itself self-consciously. If self-conscious subjects are conscious of the world, they are also conscious of the relation between themselves and the world. It’s not clear if the linguistic device of self-reference is a necessary condition for thinking about itself, i.e., if it is a condition to entertain “I”-thoughts, thoughts about oneself. In Kantian perspective it would seem not, but it’s clear that in this passage the linguistic order is to assess just in its expressive dimension of mental dimension. In fact, the condition to have the representation/concept I is considered a necessary condition to raise the human being “above all other living beings on earth.”
3 The fundamental notion of self-consciousness at the stake can be referred to as basic self-consciousness and consists of two specific features. Firstly, self-consciousness can be said to be grounded in a first-person perspective, whereas due to the second feature, self-consciousness must be regarded as a consciousness of the self as subject rather than a consciousness of the self as object. Both peculiarities are grounded in the possibility of using the term or concept I, which presents a few specific epistemic and semantic features: essential indexicality and immunity to error thorough misidentification. The former is relative to the meaning of the term/concept I, any expression of self-consciousness being based on indexical terms such as “I” or “me”; the latter, on the other hand, refers to the fact that certain singular judgments involving the self-ascription of mental and physical properties are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun (IEM). The subject formulating such judgments in given epistemic contexts cannot be mistaken as to whether it is she herself who is attributing a particular mental property to her own self. Briefly stated, the capacity for self-consciousness depends on the possibility of producing I-thoughts, which, as such, employ an indexical self-reference immune to error through misidentification relative to the concept I. The general point that has been developed in the contemporary Kantian debate is that Kant’s approach to self-consciousness seems to succeed in explaining these features of the concept I in the terms of transcendentalism in some way.
4 Generally, Kant points to two forms of self-consciousness: the inner sense, or empirical apperception, based on a sensory form of self-awareness, and transcendental apperception. Through the notion of inner sense, Kant also allows for an introspective account of self-awareness; nonetheless, Kant holds an utterly sophisticated notion of basic self-consciousness provided for by the notion of transcendental apperception. As we will see, the doctrine of apperception is not to be confused with an introspective psychological approach: in reality, it is a formal model for the thinking activity itself which explains the most central concepts regarding subjecthood.
5 Kant’s views on the mind and self-consciousness are mainly developed in the Critique of Pure Reason. Other important points are expounded in the late Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, first published in 1798, worked up from notes for popular lectures, and in several other passages dating to the critical period. In KrV, the mind and self-consciousness are only discussed in relation to major projects – epistemic and metaphysical in particular – but never in their own right. Therefore, the arguments appear to be somewhat dispersed. The two parts of KrV containing Kant’s main remarks about the mind and self-consciousness are the chapters on Transcendental Deduction and Paralogisms; as is well known, Kant completely revised both chapters for the second edition. At the same time, for this topic it’s fundamental to point out Kant’s ethics and the concept of freedom. The ‘transcendental freedom’ that underlies practical reason is related to the ‘transcendental unity of apperception’ that underlies our knowledge of nature. In this way, thanks to the unity of consciousness and the transcendental freedom, two distinct aspects of our perspective on the world can be singled out: they are transcendental in the sense that they cannot be deduced from our knowledge of the empirical world, but they are a priori as conditions of the experience and knowledge. Particularly, the knowledge of our own freedom is a part of the ‘apperception’ (A 546–7, B. 574–5.)

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