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Социальная политика: нерешенная задача научного обоснования
 
Код статьиS086904990011575-4-1
Тип публикации Статья
Статус публикации Опубликовано
Авторы
Тамбовцев Виталий Леонидович 
Должность: Заведующий лабораторией
Аффилиация: Московский государственный университет им. М.В. Ломоносова
Адрес: Российская Федерация, Ленинские горы, д. 1, стр. 46, Москва, 119991
Название журналаОбщественные науки и современность
ВыпускНомер 6
Страницы5-13
Аннотация

В данной статье автор анализирует попытки установления количественных связей между рядом экономических и политических индикаторов стран и параметрами их социальных политик посредством эконометрических методов. Отмечается, что эти исследования позволили выявить несколько частных зависимостей, справедливых для отдельных периодов, хотя общие закономерности остаются неизвестными. В этой связи анализируются также две попытки обоснования параметров социальной политики на основе таких концепций, как (1) ограниченная рациональность и подталкивание и (2) необходимость производства государством социально значимых благ. Анализ этих подходов показывает их неадекватность задаче обоснования параметров социальной политики. Общий вывод заключается в том, что эти параметры – результат дискреционного выбора политиков, которые могут преследовать разные цели в разные периоды времени, в силу чего обнаружение объективных закономерностей вряд ли возможно.

Ключевые словасоциальная политика, бюджетные расходы, ограниченная рациональность, подталкивание, социально-значимые блага
Получено15.09.2020
Дата публикации17.12.2015
Кол-во символов946
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