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European Union–China in the Changing World Composition
 
PIIS013122270018625-8-1
DOI10.20542/0131-2227-2022-66-1-68-79
Publication type Article
Status Published
Authors
Ivan Danilin 
Affiliation: Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences
Address: 23, Profsoyuznaya Str., Moscow, 117997, Russian Federation
Sergey V. Kislitsyn
Occupation: Research Associate
Affiliation: Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO)
Address: 23, Profsoyuznaya Str., Moscow, 117997, Russian Federation
Yurii Kvashnin
Affiliation: Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO)
Address: 23, Profsoyuznaya Str., Moscow, 117997, Russian Federation
I. Kobrinskaya
Affiliation: Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO)
Address: 23, Profsoyuznaya Str., Moscow, 117997, Russian Federation
Alexandr V. Lomanov
Affiliation: Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO)
Address: 23, Profsoyuznaya Str., Moscow, 117997, Russian Federation
Sergey Utkin
Affiliation: Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences
Address: 23, Profsoyuznaya Str., Moscow, 117997, Russian Federation
Journal nameMirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia
EditionVolume 66 Issue 1
Pages68-79
Abstract

By 2021, the nature of the key factors that will determine the dynamics of the EU–China relations in the medium term has become clearer. The pandemic accelerated many ongoing processes in the world, revealed “weak points” in national and regional economies and security, and exposed the true intentions of international actors. The authors proceed from the working hypothesis that an ideologized rigid approach with elements of pragmatism will dominate in the EU–China relations in the post-crisis period. The balance in the formula of these relations “partner, competitor, rival” will significantly depend on the position of the United States, as well as the European Union’s compliance with the “bloc discipline”. Competition in the field of technology will be of key importance, but the struggle for political and ideological leadership in the changing world order will also become more acute. The political response of the EU and China to technological challenges will represent a mix of protectionism and neo-techno-nationalism. Politicians in the European Union feel that toughness toward Beijing is well received by the voters. At the same time, the EU member states diverge in their approaches to China, although the efforts are made to harmonise policies both in the European Union and in the transatlantic community. In its turn, the PRC feels more confident in the technological and political competition. The pace of China catching up with the technological abilities of the EU is impressive, though significant gaps remain. Beijing does not have intentions of de-coupling from the West and keeps a strong interest in being present in the EU markets, but it becomes more selective with regard to foreign investments at home. Meanwhile, the global shift of world politics to Asia will require adjustment on the part of the European Union. A possible approach already tested in expert discussions is further engagement with trading partners and blocs in the region, especially the newly established Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. The EU–China relations and their influence, in particular, on Russia were the subject of case study organized by the Center for Situational Analysis of IMEMO RAN. For details see: Analysis and Forecasting. IMEMO Journal, 2021, no. 2. (Available at: https://www.afjournal.ru/index.php?page_id=464#).

KeywordsChina, EU, G7, U.S.A., technologies, investments, competition, world order
Received04.08.2021
Publication date18.02.2022
Number of characters36024
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Table of contents

СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВО И СОПЕРНИЧЕСТВО В СФЕРЕ ТЕХНОЛОГИЙ
ОБЩИЕ ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКИЕ ТЕНДЕНЦИИ В СВЯЗКЕ КИТАЙ–ЕС
ЭВОЛЮЦИЯ ПОДХОДА ЕС К КИТАЮ – ОЦЕНКИ ЕВРОПЕЙСКИХ ЭКСПЕРТОВ
ЕВРОПЕЙСКАЯ СТРАТЕГИЯ КИТАЯ
СПЛОЧЕНИЕ ЗАПАДА
ЧТО ДАЛЬШЕ?
1 В условиях пандемии в мировых процессах происходят минимум три значимых сдвига. Первый – деформация под влиянием региональных и национальных трендов процесса глобализации и ослабление международных институтов. Второй – усиление роли национальных государств, отчасти как компенсация ослабления их полномочий в ходе интеграционных процессов. Третий, но, очевидно, первый по значению – выход на лидерские позиции КНР.
2 Новые риски и угрозы и порождаемые ими конфликты смещают фокус безопасности с традиционной военной сферы на технологическую. Обостряется борьба за технологическое превосходство с агрессивным применением всего спектра инструментов сдерживания соперников – от протекционизма до санкций и информационных войн. Ведущие европейские аналитики подчеркивают, что “структурные изменения, проистекающие из глобального порядка, породили новые дебаты о Китае. COVID-19 обнажил и зависимость Европы, и истинные намерения Пекина” [1].
3 Меняющиеся отношения Евросоюза и КНР отражают сдвиги и противоречия в мировой политике и экономике, высвечивают ключевые индикаторы соперничества. Реальна ли “китайская угроза”, все более становящаяся смыслом и/или доминантным мотивом стратегии Брюсселя? В настоящей статье предпринята попытка ответить на этот вопрос.
4

СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВО И СОПЕРНИЧЕСТВО В СФЕРЕ ТЕХНОЛОГИЙ
5

Наряду с США, Китай был и остается крупнейшим партнером Европы в сфере хай-тек. На фоне разворачивающегося на него наступления в этой сфере позиция Пекина вынужденно оказывается двойственной. Китай все еще очень нуждается в европейских знаниях и компетенциях, особенно в контексте куда более жестких ограничений со стороны Вашингтона [2]. Заменить Европу нередко сложно или невозможно. Но одновременно КНР, вследствие санкционного “шока”, делает ставку на технологическое импортозамещение, что ведет к ослаблению связей, в том числе и с Европой.
6 Для достижения максимальной независимости в инновационной сфере разработаны стратегические и тактические программы: “Долгосрочные цели развития КНР до 2035 г.”, программа “Сделано в Китае 2025” и др. К 2025 г. страна планирует покрывать до 70% потребностей в высокотехнологичных компонентах, к 2035 г. стать одним из инновационных лидеров, а к 2050 г. – мировым инновационным лидером. Под эти задачи выделяется соответствующее финансирование НИОКР. Однако главной проблемой на этом пути остается отставание китайских фундаментальных научных школ. Для ее решения в 2021–2025 гг. предусмотрено резкое увеличение финансирования науки.
7 В ближайшем и среднесрочном будущем зависимость Китая от новых западных технологий сохранится. Но в долгосрочном, вероятно, будет снижаться за счет развития совершенно новых научных направлений, где стартовые позиции у КНР и традиционных инновационных лидеров практически одинаковые, а также благодаря внутреннему спросу на инновационные продукты. Тем более что при сохранении общего научно-технологического преимущества Евросоюза отставание от него Китая быстро сокращается. По данным Еврокомиссии, в 2014 г. индекс результативности китайских исследований и инноваций составлял всего 56% от уровня ЕС, а в 2021 г. – уже 84% [3].

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