The Problem of International Conventional Regulation of Private Military and Security Companies

 
PIIS013122270015672-0-1
DOI10.20542/0131-2227-2021-65-5-95-106
Publication type Article
Status Published
Authors
Affiliation: Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University), The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
Address: Russian Federation, Moscow
Journal nameMirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia
EditionVolume 65 Issue 5
Pages95-106
Abstract

The article examines the preconditions for the development of a UN convention on Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), and raises the question of the actors interested in creating such a document. It seeks to explain why the convention remained at the draft level, through the prism of contradictions associated with the development of international legal norms in relation to the known phenomenon of mercenarism, and in relation to new military-security structures. The present text is devoted to the analysis of the problems in determining PMSCs’ status and in separating them from such illegal actors as mercenaries, as well as to studying the difficulties associated with the promotion of the UN International Convention on the Regulation, Oversight and Monitoring of Private Military and Security Companies, that arise in the scientific community and within the UN itself. In addition, the article touches upon the problem of privatization of international law and discusses intentions of private military and security industry to privatize specific issues of PMSCs’ regulation. It emphasizes the role of non-state actors that seek ways to participate in and influence the process of international conventional regulation. On the one hand, international legal binding mechanisms aimed at regulation of PMSCs are nagging. On the other hand, current legal norms are imperfect and seem to be inappropriate for the regulation of the fast growing and evolving phenomenon – PMSCs. The combination of states’ and non-state actors’ interests at the international level challenges the system of current conventional mechanisms. Besides, numerous approaches to the identification of the range of inherent governmental functions in military sphere vary from one state to another. Similarly, some PMSCs do not see any conflict with their unclear legal status while others seek ways to come out from the shadows of obscurity and clarify their status within the international law. The article tries to unveil a range of different problems in private security sphere and explain both the complexity of private military and security industry, the ambiguous approaches towards regulation of PMSCs and the challenges the international law faces with the emergence of new non-state military and security phenomenon.

Keywordsnon-state actors, private military and security companies (PMSCs), mercenaries, UN, armed conflicts, private functions in security sphere, international law regulation, privatization of law
AcknowledgmentThe article was supported by a grant from the International Studies Institute at MGIMO University, (Project No. 1921-01-07): “New Forms of Strategic Competition of the Great Political Powers in the 21st Century” as part of the “Analysis and Forecasting the Evolution of International Relations in the Context of a Changing Technology” project.
Publication date27.06.2021
Number of characters43163
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1 Отсутствие общепринятой единообразной практики привлечения государствами частных военизированных и охранных компаний (ЧВОК) на контрактной основе на международном уровне в условиях вооруженного конфликта, а также при проведении миротворческих операций зачастую чревато негативными последствиями. Приватизация такими компаниями государственных услуг в сфере безопасности в отсутствии должного регулирования затрагивает основные права и свободы человека, ставит его безопасность под угрозу. Международная конвенция о контроле, надзоре и мониторинге за частными военизированными и охранными компаниями, разработанная Рабочей группой ООН [1], или иной международный юридически обязывающий документ представляются важным шагом для создания эффективного механизма регулирования деятельности частных военизированных компаний на основе норм международного права.
2 Одновременно с трансформацией сферы безопасности и появления в ней новых акторов существует проблема эволюции правовой действительности. На международное право сегодня оказывают влияние не только государства, но и бизнес. То есть “в настоящее время формирование и имплементация международного права все в большей степени зависят не от традиционных политических властей, а от частных лиц” [2, c. 40]. Подобно тому, как и сфера услуг в области безопасности, которая в некоторой степени приватизирована ЧВОК, международное право также оказалось подвержено приватизации.
3 Наконец, неоднозначная оценка деятельности тех или иных ЧВОК постоянно приводит как к противоречиям при попытке разделить частные компании на охранные и военизированные, так и к привязыванию таких компаний к наемникам, статус которых уже закреплен в различных международных конвенциях и в национальном законодательстве многих стран1. Следствием этого становится путаница не только на научном, академическом и экспертном уровнях, но и в ООН, где также нет единообразия. Здесь часто возникает вопрос об эффективности ЧВОК, действующих на международном рынке безопасности и во время вооруженных конфликтов, и при их участии в гуманитарных и миротворческих миссиях в период постконфликтного восстановления. 1. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I). June 8, 1977; The UN International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries. December 4, 1989; The Organization of African Unity Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa. July 3, 1977; South African Private Security Industry Regulation Act no 56 of 2001. January 25, 2002; Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Prohibition and Regulation of Certain Activities in Areas of Armed Conflict bill no 27 of 2006. November 16, 2007.
4

ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТЬ ЧВОК: ОБЩИЕ ПРОБЛЕМЫ

5 За последние десятилетия сложился значительный объем научных исследований, посвященных самым разным аспектам, касающимся ЧВОК, месту и роли государства, а также проблемам в области соблюдения прав и свобод человека в связи с их действиями. Однако все исследователи так или иначе затрагивают несколько основных проблем. Первая касается истоков приватизационных тенденций в сфере безопасности, то есть причин бурного роста спроса на услуги ЧВОК. Многие ученые называют самые разные причины возникновения и усиления данного феномена. В целом, какие бы причины не стояли за истоками приватизационных тенденций и ростом спроса на услуги ЧВОК, очевидно, что данные процессы, охватив силовую сферу, привели к частичной приватизации и сферы регулирования данной области. Современную законодательную систему сегодня институционально дополняют организации, которые либо представляют альтернативу, либо подменяют государственные институты, – кодексы поведения или саморегуляции бизнеса [2, c. 40]. Образцом перетекания приватизационных тенденций в военно-силовом бизнесе сегодня служит Международный кодекс поведения ЧВОК, принятый 9 ноября 2010 г. [3].

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