All
 
|
 
 


Iran’s Nuclear Program – Past, Present and Uncertain Future
 
PIIS013122270013276-4-1
DOI10.20542/0131-2227-2020-64-12-15-24
Publication type Article
Status Published
Authors
Anatoly S. Diyakov 
Occupation: Leading Researcher
Affiliation:
Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT)
Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO)
Address: 09, Institutskii Per., Dolgoprudnyi, Moscow Region, 141701, Russian Federation
Journal nameMirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia
EditionVolume 64 Issue 12
Pages15-24
Abstract

Over the past two decades, Iran’s nuclear program, its character and direction have been under the scrutiny of the international community. Announcing its plans for the development of nuclear energy, Iran initiated both work to create enterprises for the uranium enrichment and the construction of a heavy water reactor in Arak. However, already in the early 2000s, it was reported about Tehran’s failure to fulfil its obligations under the International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Agreement. This raised suspicions that the country was conducting covert nuclear activities aimed at creating nuclear weapons. The state of Iran’s nuclear program has become a matter of concern to the world community and, based on a number of resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council, the IAEA has made efforts to clarify the nature of the Iranian nuclear program and Iran’s implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement. It was found that until 2003, Iran had implemented a nuclear weapons program. The decision by Tehran to disclose all its nuclear activities as well as the efforts of the IAEA and multilateral diplomacy made it possible in 2015 to agree on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to resolve all questions related with the Iranian nuclear program and take measures to guarantee its exclusively peaceful nature. Since the beginning of the JCPOA implementation, Iran has strictly followed its obligations. However, the U.S.’ withdrawal from the Plan in May 2018, restoration and strengthening of their economic sanctions against Iran created a situation where Tehran, starting in July 2019, began to phase out its obligations under the JCPOA. At the same time, to date, Iran has been carrying out all its activities in close cooperation and under the constant supervision of the IAEA. The future of the Iranian nuclear program is difficult to predict, this will largely be determined by the ability of the remaining JCPOA participants to find and implement solutions which would suit all of them.

KeywordsIran, uranium enrichment, heavy-water reactor, highly enriched uranium, nuclear explosive device, JCPOA, control and verification
Received29.12.2020
Publication date29.12.2020
Number of characters31821
Cite  
100 rub.
When subscribing to an article or issue, the user can download PDF, evaluate the publication or contact the author. Need to register.
Размещенный ниже текст является ознакомительной версией и может не соответствовать печатной

Table of contents

ПРИЗНАКИ ОСУЩЕСТВЛЕНИЯ ИРАНОМ ВОЕННОЙ ЯДЕРНОЙ ПРОГРАММЫ
СОСТОЯНИЕ ЯДЕРНОЙ ПРОГРАММЫ ИРАНА К МОМЕНТУ ЗАКЛЮЧЕНИЯ СОГЛАШЕНИЯ ПО СВПД
ОСНОВНЫЕ ПОЛОЖЕНИЯ СВПД
РЕАЛИЗАЦИЯ СВПД
ВЫХОД США ИЗ СВПД
ЧЕГО ОЖИДАТЬ
1 На протяжении последних 20 лет ядерная программа Ирана, ее характер и направленность находятся под пристальным вниманием международного сообщества.
2 В сентябре 2002 г. Тегеран заявил о планах развития ядерной энергетики и о начале работ в различных областях ядерной технологии [1]. Будучи членом Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия (ДНЯО) и в соответствии с Соглашением о гарантиях INFCIRC/214, вступившим в силу 15 мая 1974 г., Иран в начале 2003 г. проинформировал Международное агентство по атомной энергии (МАГАТЭ) о своей программе по обогащению урана. Было заявлено о завершении сооружения в Натанзе экспериментальной установки по обогащению топлива (ЭУОТ) и строительстве промышленного предприятия по обогащению урана, получившее название установки по обогащении топлива (УОТ). В мае того же года Иран информировал агентство о намерении построить тяжеловодный исследовательский реактор IR-40 в Эраке.
3 В 2002 г. МАГАТЭ стало известно о получении Ираном в 1991 г. от страны-поставщика ядерного материала в виде UF6 (1000 кг), UF4 (400 кг) и UO2 (400 кг). Иран, по Соглашению о гарантиях, обязан был предоставить агентству отчет об импорте этого материала и отчет об установках, в которых тот использовался, но он этого не сделал.
4 Создание Тегераном мощностей по обогащению урана, в совокупности с нарушением его обязательств по ДНЯО, вызвали озабоченность международного сообщества. Возникло подозрение, что обогащение урана нужно Ирану для создания ядерного оружия. Наличие у страны промышленного обогащения дает ей потенциальную способность преодолеть основное техническое препятствие на пути приобретения ядерного оружия – производство оружейного делящегося материала, так как технология обогащения урана для ядерного топлива та же, что и для наработки высокообогащенного урана (ВОУ) для ядерного оружия.
5 Основываясь на озабоченности, выраженной в докладах Генерального директора МАГАТЭ в отношении ядерной программы Ирана, Совет Безопасности ООН принял несколько резолюций (1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) , 1747 (2007) , 1803 (2008) , 1835 (2008) , 1929 (2010) и 2224 (2015) ), обязывающих Иран остановить программу обогащения урана и работы по проектам, связанным со строительством исследовательского реактора IR-40. Резолюции призывали Иран действовать в соответствии с положениями Дополнительного протокола (ДП) к Соглашению о гарантиях с МАГАТЭ и принять все меры, необходимые для получения уверенности в исключительно мирных целях его ядерной программы. Существенную роль в урегулировании всех вопросов сыграла многосторонняя дипломатия с участием стран "шестерки", состоящей из постоянных членов СБ ООН + Германия.
6

ПРИЗНАКИ ОСУЩЕСТВЛЕНИЯ ИРАНОМ ВОЕННОЙ ЯДЕРНОЙ ПРОГРАММЫ
7 В связи с возникшими озабоченностями в отношении характера ядерной программы Ирана, МАГАТЭ, начиная с 2003 вплоть до середины 2015 г., вело активную работу по восстановлению истинной истории, масштаба и характера ядерной деятельности Исламской Республики.

Number of purchasers: 0, views: 854

Readers community rating: votes 0 

1. Doklad General'nogo direktora MAGATEh “Osuschestvlenie Soglasheniya o garantiyakh v svyazi s DNYaO v Islamskoj Respublike Iran”. GOV/2003/40, 6 iyunya 2003 g. [Report by IAEA Director General “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran”. GOV/2003/40, June 6, 2003 (In Russ.)] Available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2003-40_rus.pdf  (accessed 12.05.2020).
2. Doklad General'nogo direktora MAGATEh “Osuschestvlenie Soglasheniya o garantiyakh v svyazi s DNYaO v Islamskoj Respublike Iran”. GOV/2003/75, 14 noyabrya 2003 g. [Report by IAEA Director General “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran”. GOV/2003/75, November 14, 2003 (In Russ.)] Available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2003-75_rus.pdf  (accessed 12.05.2020).
3. Doklad General'nogo direktora MAGATEh “Osuschestvlenie Soglasheniya o garantiyakh v svyazi s DNYaO i sootvetstvuyuschikh polozhenij rezolyutsij Soveta Bezopasnosti v Islamskoj Respublike Iran”. GOV/2011/65, 9 noyabrya 2011 g. [Report by IAEA Director General “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran”. GOV/2011/65, November 9, 2011 (In Russ.)] Available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2011-65_rus.pdf  (accessed 12.05.2020).
4. Doklad General'nogo direktora MAGATEh “Osuschestvlenie Soglasheniya o garantiyakh v svyazi s DNYaO i sootvetstvuyuschikh polozhenij rezolyutsij Soveta Bezopasnosti v Islamskoj Respublike Iran”. GOV/2014/10, 20 fevralya 2014 g. [Report by IAEA Director General “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran” GOV/2014/10, February 20, 2014 (In Russ.)] Available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2014-10_rus.pdf  (accessed 12.05.2020).
5. Sovmestnyj vseob'emlyuschij plan dejstvij po iranskoj yadernoj programme. Kommersant', 14.07.2015. [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian Nuclear Program. Kommersant, 14.07.2015. (In Russ.)] Available at: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2768104  (accessed 13.05.2020).
6. Doklad General'nogo Direktora MAGATEh “Okonchatel'naya otsenka v otnoshenii proshlykh i nyneshnikh ostayuschikhsya voprosov po yadernoj programme Irana”. GOV/2015/68, 3 dekabrya 2015 g. [Report by IAEA Director General “Final Assessment on Past and Present Outstanding Issues Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Programme”. GOV/2015/68, December 3, 2015 (In Russ.)] Available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-2015-68_ru.pdf  (accessed 12.05.2020).
7. Doklad General'nogo direktora MAGATEh “Osuschestvlenie Soglasheniya o garantiyakh v svyazi s DNYaO i sootvetstvuyuschikh polozhenij rezolyutsij Soveta Bezopasnosti v Islamskoj Respublike Iran”. GOV/2015/65, 19 noyabrya 2015 g. [Report by IAEA Director General “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran”. GOV/2015/65, November 19, 2015 (In Russ.)] Available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-2015-65_ru.pdf  (accessed 12.05.2020).
8. Albright D., Brannan P., Kelley R. Mysteries Deepen Over Status of Arak Reactor Project. Institute for Science and International Studies, August 11, 2009. Available at: https://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/ArakFuelElement.pdf  (accessed 15.05.2020).
9. Samore G. Iran’s Nuclear Programme, Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes: A Net Assessment. London, Routledge, 2013. 128 p.
10. Andryushin I.A., Yudin Yu.A. Riski rasprostraneniya i problema ehnergeticheskogo plutoniya. Sarov, Saransk, Tipografiya “Krasnyj Oktyabr'”, 2007. 123 c. [Andryushin I.A., Yudin Yu.A. Riski rasprostraneniya i problema energeticheskogo plutoniya [Proliferation Risks and the Problem of Energy Plutonium]. Sarov, Saransk, Tipografiya “Krasnyi Oktyabr'”, 2007. 123 p.]
11. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737 (2006). Available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/unsc_res1737-2006.pdf  (accessed 12.05.2020).
12. Doklad General'nogo direktora MAGATEh “Osuschestvlenie Soglasheniya o garantiyakh v svyazi s DNYaO i sootvetstvuyuschikh polozhenij rezolyutsij Soveta Bezopasnosti v Islamskoj Respublike Iran”. GOV/2011/54, 2 sentyabrya 2011 g. [Report by IAEA Director General “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran”. GOV/2011/54, September 2, 2011 (In Russ.)] Available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2011-54_rus.pdf  (accessed 12.05.2020).
13. Proverka i monitoring v Islamskoj Respublike Iran v svete rezolyutsii 2231 (2015) Soveta Bezopasnosti Organizatsii Ob'edinennykh Natsij. GOV/INF/2015/18, 18 oktyabrya 2015 g. [Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)”. GOV/INF/2015/18, October 18, 2015 (In Russ.)] Available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-inf-2015-18_ru.pdf  (accessed 12.05.2020).
14. Report by IAEA Director General “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)”. GOV/INF/2016/1, January 16, 2016. Available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov-inf-2016-1.pdf  (accessed 12.05.2020).
15. Doklad ispolnyayuschego obyazannosti General'nogo direktora MAGATEh “Proverka i monitoring v Islamskoj Respublike Iran v svete rezolyutsii 2231 (2015) Soveta Bezopasnosti Organizatsii Ob'edinennykh Natsij”. GOV/2019/55, 12 noyabrya 2019 g. [Report by IAEA Acting Director General “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)”. GOV/2019/55, November 12, 2019 (In Russ.)] Available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/19/11/gov2019-55_rus.pdf  (accessed 12.05.2020).
16. The Full Transcript of Trump’s Speech on the Iran Nuclear Deal. The New York Times, 08.05.2018. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html  (accessed 14.05.2020).
17. Rukhani: Iran poka ostaetsya v SVPD. AtomInfo.Ru, 09.05.2018. [Rouhani: Iran Remains in the JCPOA for Now. AtomInfo.Ru, 09.05.2018. (In Russ.)] Available at: http://atominfo.ru/newss/z0292.htm  (accessed 13.05.2020).
18. Sovmestnoe zayavlenie v svyazi s vozobnovleniem amerikanskikh sanktsij vsledstvie vykhoda SShA iz SVPD. Bryussel', 06.08.2018. [Joint Statement on the Re-Imposition of US Sanctions Due to its Withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Bruxelles, 06.08.2018 (In Russ.)] Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/russia_nn/49153/Sovmestnoe%20zayavlenie%20v%20svyazi%20s%20vozobnovleniem%20amerikanskikh%20sanktsij%20vsledstvie%20vykhoda%20SShA%20iz%20SVPD  (accessed 13.05.2020).
19. Kitaj prizval k koordinatsii mer dlya obespecheniya tselostnosti soglasheniya po Iranu. AtomInfo.Ru, 09.05.2018. [China Called for Coordination of Measures to Ensure the Integrity of the Iran Agreement. AtomInfo.Ru, 09.05.2018. (In Russ.)] Available at: http://atominfo.ru/newss/z0291.htm  (accessed 13.05.2020).
20. Mikhail Ul'yanov: SVPD ostaetsya v sile za schet Irana. AtomInfo.Ru, 09.05.2018. [Mikhail Ulyanov: the JCPOA Remains in Force at the Expense of Iran. AtomInfo.Ru, 09.05.2018 (In Russ.)] Available at: http://atominfo.ru/newss/z0293.htm  (accessed 13.05.2020).
21. Ryabkov: Rossiya primet mery po umen'sheniyu uscherba ot sanktsij SShA protiv Irana. AtomInfo.Ru, 08.11.2018. [Ryabkov: Russia Will Take Measures to Reduce the Damage from US Sanctions Against Iran. AtomInfo.Ru, 08.11.2018. (In Russ.)] Available at: http://atominfo.ru/newst/a0533.htm  (accessed 13.05.2020).
22. SVPD ‒ sud'ba pod voprosom. AtomInfo.Ru, 29.06.2019. [JCPOA ‒ Fate in Question. AtomInfo.Ru, 29.06.2019. (In Russ.)] Available at: http://atominfo.ru/newsy/z0875.htm  (accessed 13.05.2020).
23. Report by IAEA Director General “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)”. GOV/2019/21, May 31, 2019. Available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/19/06/gov2019-21.pdf  (accessed 12.05.2020).
24. Doklad ispolnyayuschego obyazannosti General'nogo direktora MAGATEh “Proverka i monitoring v Islamskoj Respublike Iran v svete rezolyutsii 2231 (2015) Soveta Bezopasnosti Organizatsii Ob'edinennykh Natsij”. GOV/2019/32, 2 sentyabrya 2019 g. [Report by IAEA Acting Director General “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)”. GOV/2019/32, September 2, 2019 (In Russ.)] Available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/19/09/gov2019-32_rus.pdf  (accessed 12.05.2020).
25. Doklad General'nogo direktora MAGATEh “Proverka i monitoring v Islamskoj Respublike Iran v svete rezolyutsii 2231 (2015) Soveta Bezopasnosti Organizatsii Ob'edinennykh Natsij”. GOV/INF/2019/9, 8 iyulya 2019 g. [Report by IAEA Director General “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)”, July 8, 2019 (In Russ.)] Available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/19/07/govinf2019-9_rus.pdf  (accessed 12.05.2020).
26. Doklad General'nogo direktora MAGATEh “Proverka i monitoring v Islamskoj Respublike Iran v svete rezolyutsii 2231 (2015) Soveta Bezopasnosti Organizatsii Ob'edinennykh Natsij”. GOV/2020/5, 4 marta 2020 g. [Report by IAEA Director General “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)”, March 4, 2020 (In Russ.)] Available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/20/03/gov2020-5_rus.pdf  (accessed 12.05.2020).
27. Doklad ispolnyayuschego obyazannosti General'nogo direktora MAGATEh “Proverka i monitoring v Islamskoj Respublike Iran v svete rezolyutsii 2231 (2015) Soveta Bezopasnosti Organizatsii Ob'edinennykh Natsij”. GOV/INF/2019/10, 9 sentyabrya 2019 g. [Report by IAEA Acting Director General “Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)”. GOV/INF/2019/10, September 9, 2019 (In Russ.)] Available at: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/19/09/govinf2019-10_rus.pdf  (accessed 12.05.2020).
28. Iran razrabatyvaet tsentrifugu IR-9 proizvoditel'nost'yu v 50 raz bol'she IR-1 ‒ chinovnik. AtomInfo.Ru, 05.11.2019. [Iran is Developing an IR-9 Centrifuge with a Capacity 50 Times Greater than IR-1‒ Official. AtomInfo.Ru, 05.11.2019. (In Russ.)] Available at: http://atominfo.ru/newsz/a0507.htm  (accessed 13.05.2020).
29. Iranskie zapasy obogaschennogo urana dostigli 800 kg – vlasti. AtomInfo.Ru, 24.12.2019. [Iran's Stockpile of Enriched Uranium has Reached 800 kg – Authorities. AtomInfo.Ru, 24.12.2019. (In Russ.)] Available at: http://atominfo.ru/newsz/a0849.htm  (accessed 13.05.2020).
30. Iran May Block UN Inspectors if it Faces a ‘New Situation’. Associated Press, 03.02.2020. Available at: https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2020-02-03/iran-may-block-un-inspectors-if-it-faces-a-new-situation  (accessed 13.05.2020).
31. Report by IAEA Director General “NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran”. GOV/2020/15, March 3, 2020. Available at: https://isis-online.org/uploads/iaea-reports/documents/IAEA_Iran_NPT_March_2020_report.pdf  (accessed 12.05.2020).

Система Orphus

Loading...
Up