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Poland in Soviet Foreign Policy from late 1919 to 16 July 1920
 
Название публикации (др.)Польша в советской внешней политике с конца 1919 до 16 июля 1920 г.
Код статьиS207987840015567-2-1
DOI10.18254/S207987840015567-2
Тип публикации Статья
Статус публикации Опубликовано
Авторы
Матвеев Геннадий Филиппович 
Аффилиация: МГУ им. М. В. Ломоносова
Адрес: Российская Федерация, Москва
Название журналаИстория
Выпуск
Аннотация

В конце 1919 г. гражданская война в России близилась к завершению, и руководство РСФСР озаботилось восстановлением промышленности и налаживанием международных экономических отношений, в первую очередь с Великобританией. 5 декабря 1919 г. VII съезд Советов предложил странам Антанты заключить мир, положив тем самым начало политике «мирного наступления» РСФСР. Первыми на это обращение откликнулись республики Прибалтики. 2 февраля 1920 г. Советская Россия подписала мир с Эстонией, начались переговоры с Литвой и Латвией. Лишь Польша не торопилась с ответом, несмотря на прямое обращение к ней НКИД, СНК и ВЦИК и обещание территориальных уступок. Ю. Пилсудский ждал весны. 25 апреля 1920 г. он возобновил наступление, остановленное в октябре 1919 г. Но и после этого Москва, налаживавшая в мае–июне прямые контакты с Лондоном, надеялась на мир с Варшавой. Даже после прорыва Красной армией польского фронта советская сторона не отказывалась от взятого ею курса. Ее политика изменилась после получения 12 июля 1920 г. ноты Д. Керзона о безотлагательном начале мирных переговоров. При обсуждении ответа на нее на пленуме ЦК РКП(б) 16 июля В.И. Ленин неожиданно предложил «помочь пролетариату и трудящимся массам Польши освободиться от их буржуазии и помещиков». Принимая это решение, Москва тем самым отходила от политики «мирного наступления». Но сделала она это лишь на польском направлении.

Ключевые словагражданская война в СССР, внешняя политика, РСФСР, прибалтийские страны, Великобритания, Польша, В.И. Ленин, Ю. Пилсудский, дипломатические переговоры, советизация Польши
Источник финансированияThis article is a translation of: Матвеев Г. Ф. Польша в советской внешней политике с конца 1919 до 16 июля 1920 года // Новая и Новейшая история. 2021. Вып. 3. C. 130—143. DOI: 10.31857/S013038640014696-3
Получено17.02.2021
Дата публикации17.05.2021
Кол-во символов51781
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1

At the end of 1919, the Soviet leadership could finally breathe more freely. First, decisive victories were won over the armies of N. N. Yudenich, A. I. Denikin and A. V. Kolchak, and negotiations in Mikashevichi by Yu. Markhlevsky, a prominent figure in the international communist movement, speaking on behalf of the Russian Red Cross Society, with representatives of Yu. Pilsudsky led to the termination of major offensive operations of the Polish army — albeit without setting the time frame for this unspoken truce1. These changes instilled confidence in the imminent end of the civil war. Since the end of 1919, the country's leaders began to consider the restoration of the economy, primarily industry and transport, as the priority task facing the country. On January 10, 1920, Lenin wrote: “Now we are happily ending the civil war. The Soviet Republic is being strengthened by its victories over the exploiters. The Soviet republic can and must henceforth concentrate its forces ... on a bloodless war, on a war for victory over hunger, cold, and devastation”2. The change in priorities in the internal policy of the RSFSR is also evidenced by the transformation in the first half of April 1920 of the Council of Workers 'and Peasants' Defense into the Council of Labor and Defense.

 1. Soviet — Polish relations in 1918—1945. T. 1. 1918—1926. M., 2017. S. 38.

2. Lenin V.I. In the bureau of the women’s congress of the Petrograd province // Complete Works. T. 40. M., 1974. S. 50. On January 27, 1920, he formulated the same thoughts as follows: “Before us is a task concerning the change of two lanes of our activity. The period that was entirely occupied by the war has not yet ended. A number of signs indicate that the Russian capitalists will not be able to continue the war. But that they will make attempts to invade Russia is beyond doubt. And we must be on our guard. But, in general, the war that they unleashed on us two years ago is over victoriously, and we are moving on to peaceful tasks” / Lenin V. I. Speech at the III All-Russian Congress of Soviets of the National Economy on January 27, 1920. Newspaper report // Ibid. T. 40. S. 78.
2

Secondly, in November 1919 there were some signs of a change for the better in the international position of the RSFSR. For the Soviet side, the establishment of trade with the West acquired paramount political and economic importance at that moment3. For the fastest economic recovery in 1920, labor service was introduced. The army was a large reserve of manpower, but they were in no hurry to demobilize it, since the war was not over yet; besides, the state of transport interfered with it4. Therefore, part of the armed forces, at the suggestion of L. D. Trotsky was transferred to the position of labor armies5. But the economic recovery was hampered not so much by the lack of workers as by the deplorable state of the fleet of machinery, machine tools, and equipment, mainly of Western production. Unable to solve this problem on its own, Soviet Russia was vitally interested in the earliest possible inclusion in international trade6. Germany, before the First World War, one of the main suppliers of machine tools and industrial equipment to Russia, was limited by the Entente in the freedom of its foreign policy actions, including in the Soviet direction. Due to the special involvement of France in the civil war in Russia on the side of the Whites, the main likely partner of Moscow could only be London, which at that moment was more conciliatory than Paris7.

 3. From the report of the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. V. Chicherin at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the foreign policy of Soviet Russia [17.II.1920] // Documents and materials on the history of Soviet — Polish relations (hereinafter — DMISPO). T. III. M., 1965. S. 95.

4. “For the sake of restoring transport, we are creating labor armies, one of which has already begun the construction of the Aleksandrov Gai — Guryev road for the supply of oil ... Demobilization is also hampered by the destruction of transport. Therefore, we will use the army to restore transport” / Lenin V. I. Speech at a non-partisan conference of workers and Red Army men of the Presnensky District on January 24, 1920. Newspaper report // Complete Works. T. 40. S. 69.

5. Ibid. S. 567—569.

6. On February 3, 1920, V. I. Lenin’s deputy in the SNK A. I. Rykov said at the first session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets: “During the forthcoming exchange of goods, we must take from Western Europe in exchange for our raw materials what we need ... We must receive in return machine tools, machines and everything that is needed to renew our industry” // Izvestia. 4.II.1920.

7. Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs J. Curzon to the British envoy in Poland G. Rumboldt about the conversation of the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Patek with the Prime Minister D. Lloyd — George about the proposal of the Soviet government to Poland to start peace negotiations [27.I.1920] // DMISPO. T. II. M., 1964. S. 503.
3

In an effort to quickly end the state of war in which Russia had been since 1914, and proceeding from the current situation in the international arena, on December 5, 1919, the VII Congress of Soviets adopted a draft resolution prepared by Lenin, proposing that the Entente powers “all together and separately begin immediate negotiations on peace”8, thus initiating the policy of the so-called Soviet “peaceful offensive”. There is no reason to consider this policy as a purely tactical ploy or diplomatic game9 in order to obtain a temporary respite and prepare an offensive on the Polish front, so that through Poland, as V. I. Lenin dreamed in February 1919, “the torch lit in Russia of the world socialist revolution ... could be transferred ... to more advanced and generally to all countries”10. In fact, in his behavior, already from February 1919, an understanding began to be seen that in the near future a revolution in Europe was unlikely to begin, as a result of which it was necessary to look for opportunities for peaceful coexistence with the capitalist encirclement for a certain historical perspective11. Peace treaties with neighbors were supposed to thwart the French plans to encircle the RSFSR with “barbed wire” and create a kind of Soviet “cordon sanitaire” or security belt along the perimeter of its borders, making it difficult for the Western powers to use the countries that made it up against Russia.

 8. 7th All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers, Peasants, Red Army and Cossack Deputies: verbatim report (December 5—9, 1919 in Moscow). M., 1920. S. 46—47.

9. Materski W. Tarcza Europy. Stosunki polsko — sowieckie 1918—1938. Warszawa 1994. S. 43, 46.

10. Lenin V. I. Draft program of the RCP (b) // Complete Works. T. 38. M., 1969. S. 89.

11. Matveev G. F. “Sovietization of Poland” in the foreign policy of the RSFSR in 1919—1920 // Centenary of the 1917 Revolution in Russia. T. 1. M., 2018. S. 416—417.
4

One of the priority goals of this policy was the Baltic states — limitrophes and the closest neighbors of the RSFSR. The first success was the peace treaty of February 2, 1920 with Estonia, whose ports were needed for Soviet sea trade. V. I. Lenin, assessing the significance of the Tartu Treaty for the RSFSR, stressed on the eve of its signing that it “gives us an actual breakthrough of the blockade, even if the formal lifting of the blockade is just a deception”12. The agreement of the Soviet side to territorial concessions and payment of 15 million rubles in gold to Estonia was not accidental13.

 12. Lenin V. I. Speech at a non-partisan conference of workers and ... // Complete Works. T. 40. S. 68.

13. V. I. Lenin, answering a question about the conditions of peace with Estonia, said: “We have made many concessions, the main one of which is the concession of the disputed territory inhabited by a mixed — Russian and Estonian — population. But we do not want to shed the blood of workers and Red Army men for a piece of land”, and then expressed confidence that “the workers ... will soon overthrow this government and create Soviet Estonia, which will conclude a new peace with us” / Ibid. S. 71. If we take into account the fact that Soviet policy has a second priority goal, then this explanation can be interpreted as simply unwillingness to publicly name it.
5 Implementing the policy of a peaceful offensive, the RSFSR in 1920—1921 signed peace treaties not only with Estonia, but also with Lithuania, Latvia, Finland, Georgia, Armenia, Persia, Turkey, Afghanistan, went on to create the Far Eastern Republic. Of course, under favorable conditions, the Kremlin was not averse to extending Soviet power to adjacent territories, unless this threatened a full-scale war with the Entente. But no compromise with White Russia, as was the case in January 1919, was now impossible. When in these months V. I. Lenin talked about the civil war, he always had in mind only the victorious end of the war with Denikin, in whose hands still remained the south of Russia, Ukraine and the North Caucasus14. 14. Lenin V. I. Letter to the workers and peasants of Ukraine on the victory over Denikin [28.XII.1919] // Complete Works. T. 40. S. 41.

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