Chinese Model of the People’s War in the Estimates of the RAND Corporation Experts

 
PIIS207987840013251-5-1
DOI10.18254/S207987840013251-5
Publication type Article
Status Published
Authors
Affiliation: Samara State University of Social Sciences and Education
Address: Russian Federation, Samara
Affiliation: Samara State University of Social Sciences and Education
Address: Russian Federation, Samara
Journal nameISTORIYA
Edition
Abstract

The article discusses the characteristic features of the expert support of U. S. policy in Southeast Asia in the 1960s within the framework of the analytical activities of the RAND Corporation to understand the phenomenon of the Chinese model of people's war. Special attention is paid to the positions of experts who cooperated with the Pentagon on a contractual basis on the forms and ways of its export to the “third world” countries enflamed by the revolutionary liberation movements in the context of the Cold War — as a special option for China to conduct “proxy war” to protect and strengthen its regional position. At the same time, the study focuses not only on the views of experts presented in the most conceptual reports of the RAND on the prospects of transferring the Chinese model of people's war (especially to Vietnam in the light of the full involvement of the United States in the conflict in that country), but also on the factors that influenced the interpretations of the phenomenon of the Chinese model of people's war in the expert community.

Keywordspeople’s war, counterinsurgency, Chinese model, expert community, RAND Corporation, transfer
Received17.05.2020
Publication date31.12.2020
Number of characters29015
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