Segmented terrorism in the Sahara-Sahel zone. The second stage: 2016-2021

Occupation: Senior Research Fellow
Affiliation: Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences
Address: Moscow, 30/1 Spiridonovka, Moscow, 123001, Russia

Journal name

Asia and Africa Today

Edition

Issue 2

Pages

47-55

Abstract

Several distinctive points characterize the second stage under analyses: the expansion of new armed alliances - Jamā’at Nuṣrat al Islām wal Muslimīn (JNIM) and Islamic State of the Greater Sahara (ISGS); the rise of resistance movement; the growth of inter- and intra-communal tensions.

Conflicts embraced the regions of Central Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, populated predominantly by ethnic Fulani. Armed jihadi groups spread alarmingly in the northern border zones of Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Western Nigeria. Trying to stop destabilization, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso harshly and unduly pressed local population (predominantly the cattle-breeder Fulani) instead of mounting preventive measures.

Indiscriminating state military campaigns further provoked radicalisation of ethno-militias aggravating struggle for meager resources, retaliatory actions and ethnic cleansing. The net result of the government’s policies has been inflation of its legitimacy in the Fulani populated regions of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. It became the best situation for JNIM and ISGS to recruit.

In contrast with the previous stage, JNIM and ISGS are deeply rooted in local clan-cast structures and enjoy more support from wider population. For some years theу have effectively managed access to pastures and water resources, resolve communal disputes and protect willing pastoralists, hunters, traders and peasants from bandits and corrupt state officials.

Drivers and deep causes of the situation cannot be explained from the perspective of ‘common enemy’ in the ‘war on terror’ - implicit impetus of many anti-terror studies and related international laws, both in dire need of revaluation.

Keywords

armed alliances, JNIM, ISGS, resistance movement, Fulani, clan-cast structures, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso

Received

02.12.2021

Publication date

02.03.2022

Number of characters

31847

Cite

GOST	Ponomarev I. Segmented terrorism in the Sahara-Sahel zone. The second stage: 2016-2021 // Asia and Africa Today – 2022. – Issue 2 C. 47-55 [Electronic resource]. URL: https://asaf-today.ru/S032150750018779-8-1 (circulation date: 23.04.2024). DOI: 10.31857/S032150750018779-8
MLA	Ponomarev, Ilia V "Segmented terrorism in the Sahara-Sahel zone. The second stage: 2016-2021." Asia and Africa Today 2 (2022):47-55. DOI: 10.31857/S032150750018779-8
APA	Ponomarev I. (2022). Segmented terrorism in the Sahara-Sahel zone. The second stage: 2016-2021. Asia and Africa Today (2), pp.47-55 DOI: 10.31857/S032150750018779-8

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