The article analyzes the role of the civil-military authorities of Pakistan in negotiation process between the US-Kabul administrations and the Taliban, which passed through the US ban on negotiations with militants (2003-2014), the failure of the Kabul-Taliban negotiations (2015), Pakistan brokering in direct negotiations the US-Taliban (2018-2020)). US-Taliban deal is vindication of Islamabad’s stance that there is no military solution to the Afghan crisis.

The International antiterrorist military campaign and entry of NATO troops in the Afghanistan in 2001 posed a challenge to Pakistan’s security. The next challenge for Pakistan was the growing influence of India in Afghanistan. This was contrary to Pakistani interests in the region.

In late 1990-s New Delhi supported the Northern Alliance, hostile to the Afghan Pashtuns and, accordingly, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA, 1996-2001). Pakistan that time strengthen diplomatic relations with Taliban government. That is why Pakistan was deeply interested in direct talks the US-Taliban in 2018-2020 and then to bring Taliban to power.

It explains the interest of Pakistan to include in Taliban’s negotiation team in several close followers of Mullah Omar, emir of the IEA. At the same time it means the recognition the legitimacy Taliban as one of the influential political actors in Afghanistan by the international community in 2020.

The return of Taliban leaders to the political mainstream of Afghanistan, with the simultaneous withdrawal of American troops from the country, changes the matrix of the balance of geostrategic forces in the region.