Institutional and Informal Lobbying Practices: The Problem of Separation and Interpretation

Publication type Article
Status Published
Affiliation: Russian State University for the Humanities
Address: Russian Federation, Moscow
Journal nameSotsiologicheskie issledovaniya
EditionIssue 11

The possibilities and limitations of institutional (including legislative) regulation of interest groups' representation and lobbying practices in their interaction with the power structures are analyzed. Almost any legal institutional lobbyist transaction has its informal "counterpart", which reduces transaction costs on the markets of public communications. Laws are able to absorb only a small fraction of behavioral diversity in the lobbyist market, regardless of the status of any national legislation. The author identifies five reasons why formal and informal lobbyism are complementary rather than interchangeable activities. The subjects of informal lobbyism (including social networks) are characterized.

Keywordspolitical sociology, lobbyism, informal social interactions, informal practices, interest groups, regulation, institutional communications
AcknowledgmentThis article is a translation of: Левичева В.Ф. Институциональные и неформальные практики лоббизма: проблема разделения и интерпретации // Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniia. 2021. No 10: 50–60. DOI: 0.31857/S013216250017165-4
Publication date22.12.2021
Number of characters34769
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