Oil or blood? The determinants of insurgency outcom in Syria and Iraq

The study of insurgency outcomes in oil-producing states, in the Middle East, has been slightly explored by past scholars. Nowadays it is becoming increasingly important to understand why different groups can be more successful than others and what are the determinants that shape insurgency outcomes.

For this analysis I have selected four case studies: ISIS (in Iraq and Syria), Free Syrian Army (FSA), Iraqi Kurdistan Region (KRG – PUK) and Syrian Kurds (Rojava region, PYD and YPG), in the period from 2012 to 2018. This four groups have been compared because they offer a complete vision of all possible models of insurgent groups, that are present in middle eastern oilproducing states.

Four common key factors have been found: 1) management of natural resources, 2) management of territory under control, 3) military capacity and 4) incrementation of group’s demography, and the sum of each factor determines if the group was successful and when. The highest will be the group’s capacity in each of the four factors, the highest will be the level of success.

The peculiarity of this study, based on the calculation of the level of success, offer a new model that can be applied to review past conflicts, develop future insurgency/anti-insurgency campaigns and forecast future conflicts in oil-producing states.

Ключевые слова

insurgent groups, oil, level of success, Middle East, calculation-model

Получено

14.05.2019

Дата публикации

22.05.2019

Кол-во символов

27021

Цитировать

ГОСТ	Savasta L. . Oil or blood? The determinants of insurgency outcom in Syria and Iraq // Азия и Африка сегодня – 2019. – Выпуск №5 C. 62-68 [Электронный ресурс]. URL: https://asaf-today.ru/S032150750004753-0-1 (дата обращения: 26.04.2024). DOI: 10.31857/S032150750004753-0
MLA	Savasta, L. "Oil or blood? The determinants of insurgency outcom in Syria and Iraq." Asia and Africa Today 5 (2019):62-68. DOI: 10.31857/S032150750004753-0
APA	Savasta L. (2019). Oil or blood? The determinants of insurgency outcom in Syria and Iraq. Asia and Africa Today (5), pp.62-68 DOI: 10.31857/S032150750004753-0

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