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Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates: Tactical or Strategic Partnership?
 
PIIS086919080033723-2-1
DOI10.31696/S086919080033723-2
Publication type Article
Status Published
Authors
Andrey Korotayev 
Occupation: Dr.Sc. (History), Professor, Director, Centre for Stability and Risk Analysis, HSE University; Chief Research Professor, Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies, Institute for African Studies and Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sc
Affiliation:
head of the Laboratory of monitoring of risks of sociopolitical destabilization National Research University Higher School of Economics, leading researcher of the Institute of Oriental studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Professor FGP MSU
Address: Russian Federation, Moscow
Timur R. Khairullin
Occupation: PhD (Political Science), Senior Researcher, Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies, Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences; Senior Researcher, Saint-Petersburg State University; Senior Lecturer, Financial University under the G
Affiliation:
Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences
Saint-Petersburg State University
Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation
Address: Russian Federation, Moscow
Andrei I. Shelkovnikov
Occupation: PhD student, HSE University
Affiliation: HSE University
Address: Russian Federation, Moscow
Journal nameVostok. Afro-Aziatskie obshchestva: istoriia i sovremennost
EditionIssue 1
Pages195-207
Abstract

The article analyzes the Saudi-Emirati alliance formed after the events of the Arab Spring as a reaction to the strengthening of the Turkish-Qatari alliance. The common point of contact in the process of rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and the UAE was the fear and suspicion of the transnational organization Muslim Brotherhood supported by Qatar and Turkey. The Islamist views preached by the «Ikhwans» pose a direct threat to the conservative ideology dominant in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. In addition, Qatar's independent regional policy, particularly the strengthening of its financial and economic potential, as well as its rapprochement with Turkey, became additional factors that led Saudi Arabia and the UAE to form an informal alliance. The active countermeasures of the Saudi-Emirati bloc led to noticeable losses in the positions of the Muslim Brotherhood and its patrons, but did not eliminate its potential. The authors examine the main features of Saudi-UAE relations. Special attention is paid to the historical background of the monarchies' rivalry, and the contradictions in their regional strategies after the Arab Spring are analyzed in detail. It concludes that the rivalry between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi will intensify, which is related both to the formation of a new power center in Abu Dhabi and to issues of broader diplomatic and economic contradictions. Despite the differences in regional strategy, the Saudi-Emirati bloc, formed in response to the challenges of the Arab Spring, has become one of the most significant factors in regional politics and the transformation of the balance of power in the MENA region.

KeywordsUAE, Saudi Arabia, alliance, rivalry, regional leadership, balance of power, Middle East, Africa, Arab Spring.
AcknowledgmentThe authors acknowledge Saint-Petersburg State University for a research project 116471555.
Received03.02.2025
Publication date23.02.2025
Number of characters29229
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Table of contents

Введение
Общие точки соприкосновения Эр-Рияда и Абу-Даби
Противодействие региональным угрозам
История саудовско-эмиратских противоречий
Разногласия в период «арабской весны»
Различия в региональной дипломатии
Заключение
1

Введение
2 События «арабской весны» существенно повлияли на конфигурацию сил на геополитической карте Ближнего Востока и Северной Африки (БВСА). Помимо традиционных игроков – Египта, Саудовской Аравии, Ирана, Ирака, Израиля, борющихся за укрепление позиций в регионе, в период «арабской весны» появились новые претенденты на региональное лидерство в лице Катара, Турции, ОАЭ. Более того, произошло стратегическое объединение сил между Катаром и Турцией, которые на фоне роста протестных выступлений попытались укрепить свои позиции в ряде стран БВСА.
3 Наряду с использованием финансовых и дипломатических рычагов, катарско-турецкий альянс поддержал различные исламистские движения, в основном, связанные с «Братьями-мусульманами» (ал-ихван ал-муслимун). В частности, падение авторитарного режима в Египте привело «братьев» к власти [Ketchley, 2017], в Тунисе к власти пришла близкая к ихванам исламистская партия «Aн-Нахда» [Madini, 2014], в Ливии – ливийское отделение «Братьев-мусульман», Партия справедливости и строительства [Ali, 2011; Grinin et al., 2019: 195–197]. В Марокко исламистская Партия справедливости и развития, близкая к «братьям» заняла лидирующие позиции в парламенте, а в Йемене, Иордании и Сирии филиалы «братьев» возглавили протестные выступления [Васильев, Хайруллин, Коротаев, 2019]. Беспрецедентное усиление позиций транснациональной организации «Братья-мусульмане» и их покровителей в лице Катара и Турции не могли не вызвать реакции со стороны консервативно настроенных кругов, в особенности суннитских монархий во главе с Саудовской Аравией.
4 До событий «арабской весны» внешнеполитический вектор монархий Персидского залива развивался в рамках контуров, формируемых Саудовской Аравией. Однако «арабская весна» обнажила скрытые противоречия между рядом монархий – членов организации. Активную роль в выстраивании самостоятельной политики продемонстрировал Катар, который, сблизившись с Турцией, бросил вызов лидирующим позициям Саудовской Аравии в регионе.
5 Исходя из того, что по отдельности Катар и Турция имели мало шансов добиться лидирующих позиций в БВСА, объединение катарской финансовой мощи и турецкого военно-политического потенциала способствовало формированию крайне эффективного альянса, сопоставимого с региональными позициями Саудовской Аравии или Ирана. Важнейшую роль в освещении событий «арабской весны» сыграл мощнейший медиа-ресурс Катара – телеканал Аль-Джазира, который в т.ч. способствовал росту популярности «Братьев-мусульман» в регионе [Хайруллин, Коротаев, 2022a].
6 Для Саудовской Аравии ассоциация «Братья-мусульмане», в которой преобладают умеренные исламистские взгляды о республиканской форме правления и сочетаемости исламских принципов управления государством с демократическим ценностями, представляют прямую угрозу существования монархического строя. Кроме того, эти идеи идут вразрез с официальным консервативным исламом Саудовской Аравии [Васильев, 1999]. Более того, победа на президентских выборах представителя «Братьев-мусульман» М. Мурси в Египте в 2012 г. и последующий обмен визитами с иранским коллегой обозначили возможность установления дружественных отношений между Египтом и Ираном. Для Саудовской Аравии египетско-иранское сближение несло прямую угрозу государственной безопасности и интересам в регионе. Отметим, что ОАЭ разделяли беспокойство Эр-Рияда, что обусловило переход к принятию саудовцами и эмиратцами активных действий по нивелированию новых угроз.

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